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The intent of this thesis is to investigate possible
measures of concern for U.S. national security. It is an
exploratory attempt at categorizing, correlating, and
explaining trends in Congressional, presidential, and public
concern for national security between 1950 and 1977. Chap-
ters II through IV discuss measures of Congressional concern
based on defense appropriations; presidential concern based
on the national security related remarks in the annual state
of the union presentations and the defense budget requests;
and public concern based on public opinion poll data. Chap-
ter V discusses what the President has recommended be done
and what forces and capabilities the Department of Defense
has developed to counter the perceived threat to U.S.
national security. The findings and conclusions of the indi-
vidual chapters are then brought together in Chapter VI as
a summarization and explanation of the trends and major
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I. INTRODUCTION
The freedom and safety of all Americans, as well as the
American way of life, has always been a function of U.S.
national security. But, continuing interest in national
security affairs is a relative newcomer to the list of major
American concerns. Prior to World War II, U.S. national
security was virtually guaranteed by its geographic isolation
from the European center of military and political power.
Since major threats to U.S. security were relatively few and
far between and the U.S. was never subjected to the invasion,
devastation, and destruction that Europe had experienced over
the years, America developed a tradition whereby interest in
national security affairs and support for the military was
greatest only during time of war, when the threat was readily
identifiable
.
That tradition was, however, changed by the outcome of
World War II. While the U.S. had emerged from the war as the
world's dominant military power and political leader of the
free world, the Soviet Union emerged as the dominant power in
Eurasia, when the traditional European and world powers were
virtually destroyed. As the war ended, the U.S. moved toward
its traditional peacetime deemphasis of the military, since
the nation once again seemed secure from external threats.
But, at the same time a new threat emerged, as the Soviet
Union shifted from wartime ally to "peacetime" adversary.
Although the overrunning of Eastern Europe, the coup in

Czechoslovakia, and the Berlin blockade signaled the start
of the Cold War, the Korean conflict reinforced the reality
of the communist threat to not only Europe and Asia, but
ultimately the United States. Additionally, the potential
threat posed by the Soviet Union breaking the U.S. nuclear
weapon monopoly and developing delivery systems which could
bring the devastation of war to the U.S. homeland, negated
the historical geographic advantage and added a new dimension
to the threat to U.S. national security.
The Cold War dominated the military-political arena from
the late 1940s through the early 1960s and facilitated the
transformation of American attitudes to an unprecedented
level of "peacetime" concern for national security affairs
and support for the military. Although both the political
and military threats were heavily emphasized and Premier
Khrushchev became well known for his boastful, saber-rattling
speeches, the decade of the 1950s was not only free of war
that threatened U.S. security, but also highly prosperous
for the U.S. By the fall of 1962, communist foreign policy
initiatives had failed in the Congo and Indonesia and the
Cuban Missile Crisis had served to highlight Soviet military
inferiority vis-a-vis the U.S.
Having apparently solved the military problem and effec-
tively contained the communist threat, the U.S. began to turn
increasingly inward to domestic problems and issues. By the
late 1960s, U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and the appar-
ent decrease in the perceived threat to U.S. national security
10

precipitated an increasing dissatisfaction with defense poli-
cies and a growing demand to reorder national priorities.
While this was in effect a rejection of the previous decade's
unprecedented growth of military power and influence and a
call to return to the traditional peacetime deemphasis of
national security affairs and the military, it is ironic that
it occurred as the Soviet Union made its most significant
strides toward closing the gap between U.S. and Soviet mili-
tary power. By the mid-1970s the military balance began to
be seriously questioned and in 1976, former Secretary of
Defense James R. Schlesinger noted that for too many Americans,
national security had become accepted as a given state of
nature. He went on to add that the current threat to U.S.
and world security is more serious than at any time since the
1930s.
... the military balance is deteriorating, but
the trend in large goes unnoticed because the
Soviets today, though expansion minded, speak
in less bombastic and threatening terms than
the Nazis did (Ref . 1, p. 75)
.
Figure 1 shows four commonly used measures which clearly
indicate that the relative priority given national security
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Figure 1: National Defense; as a percentage of
Source: Clayton (Ref. 2, p. 367)
Was Sir John Slessor anticipating the American attitude of
the late 1960s and 1970s when he remarked that "there is a
tendency to forget that the most important social service
that a government can do for its people is to keep them alive
and free"? (Ref. 3, p. 650). Can concern be measured? What
are the indicators? What are the trends?
A. THESIS OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to attempt to answer
these questions. It is an exploratory attempt at categorizing,
correlating, and explaining trends in presidential, Congres-
sional, and public concern for U.S. national security over
12

the period from 1950 through 1977. It also links trends in
concern with the development of U.S. military forces and
capabilities
.
B. THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS
Chapter II discusses Congressional concern for national
security based on Congress' "power of the purse." The pri-
mary focus of the chapter is on changes in Congressional
defense appropriations, but two alternative measures are
also discussed, since defense appropriations do not include
all the activities which can be or are commonly related to
national security.
Presidential concern is dealt with in Chapter III.
Although it is usually unstated, the underlying presidential
concern must be the maintenance of national security in order
to ensure national sovereignty and the American way of life.
The President's concern for national security is articulated
for the benefit of both foreign and domestic audiences in
formal presentations. Two of those presentations, the annual
State of the Union Message and the defense budget request,
are discussed as indicators of presidential concern over time.
Chapter IV focusses on possible indicators of public con-
cern. Since public opinion is difficult to identify, much
less measure, this is a difficult problem area to deal with.
Although the public opinion polls have limitations and there
is no consistently asked question which directly taps the
public concern for national security over time, these polls
are the best source available. The measures discussed in this
13

chapter include the number and type of questions asked by
the Gallup Poll over the period, the national security related
responses to the "most important problem" question, and the
public attitude toward defense spending. Some of the recent
specialized polls and research efforts are also discussed as
a substantiating measure and an alternative approach to
measuring public concern for national security.
Chapter V is an explanatory analysis of what the Presi-
dent has recommended that the nation do and what the Depart-
ment of Defense has done, in terms of developing military
capabilities to counter the perceived threat to U.S. national
security. This chapter helps to explain the major changes
in presidential, Congressional, and public concern for U.S.
national security over the 1950-1977 period. The presidential
portion is based on the national security remarks from the
State of the Union Messages, while the DOD portion is based
on changes in force structure and service and program emphasis.
The individual conclusions and findings from Chapters II
through V are then brought together in Chapter VI as a con-
cluding explanation of the trends and major changes in Ameri-




The objective of this chapter is to develop and discuss
an indicator of Congressional concern for national security
that can later be compared with indicators of presidential
and public concern in Chapter VI. Although there is no
standard measure available, since Congress holds the "power
of the purse" and ultimately decides the allocation of funds
to all federally supported probrams, the output of the Con-
gressional budgetary process, Congressional appropriations,
can be viewed as an indicator of Congressional concern.
Specific program appropriations are a function of national
policies and priorities and dependent on the assessment of
how the political, economic, and military capabilities and
intentions of other nations, friend or foe, affect U.S. free-
dom and safety. Congressional concern for national security
should, therefore, be reflected by changes in national secur-
ity related appropriations. All other things being equal,
defense related appropriations should normally change (.increase
or decrease) when the perceived threat to and the associated
concern for national security affairs changes (increases or
decreases)
.
While it may be generally agreed that Congressional
appropriations for national security related activities are
indicative of Congressional concern, it should be noted that
there is no agreed upon method or measure of what activities
or appropriations should be included under the title of
15

national security affairs. For that reason and even though
the primary focus of this chapter is on Congressional defense
appropriations, two alternative measures, the U.S. budget
"national defense" account and the Joint Economic Committee
of the Congress 1 (JEC) proposed "national security" account,
are also discussed.
A. APPROPRIATIONS, DEFENSE, AND SECURITY
Of the three measures discussed herein, Congressional
defense appropriations represent the narrowest definition of
the cost of national security. These appropriations are the
product of the Congressional Defense Appropriations Bill,
which delineates the upper limit to which the Department of
Defense can commit or obligate federal funds during the up-
coming fiscal year for military personnel, operations and
maintenance, procurement, and research, development, test,
and evaluation (RDT&E) . It does not include military con-
struction, which is considered under separate legislation.
The U.S. budget "national defense" account is a somewhat
broader definition of the cost of national security. This
account includes Congressional defense appropriations plus
military assistance payments from the "international affairs"
account, military atomic energy development and production
costs, stockpiling, selective service, and numerous minor
Prior to fiscal year 1976, all atomic energy development
and production costs were included in the "national defense"
account. Since that time, civilian nuclear energy develop-




defense related costs, minus offsetting receipts from activi-
ties such as foreign military sales. The JEC ' s proposed
"national security" account is one of the broadest definitions
of the cost of national security. This method would further
add all veterans' benefits, all space and related research
costs, 75% of the interest on the national debt, more items
from the "international affairs" account, expenses associated
with the U.S. Arms and Disarmament Agency, the National
Security Council, and impacted area school aid, as well as a
number of other minor defense related costs (Ref. 2, p. 365).
It is therefore apparent that Congressional defense appro-
priations are only part of the total cost of national secur-
ity and that one must be aware of the definitions used and
activities included when discussing the cost of national
security. Figure 2, which is based on data contained in
Appendix A, shows the 1950-1977 trends for all three account-
ing methods. It must be pointed out that since the JEC data
is not available for the entire period under study, the
"national security" account figures used herein are an approx-
2imation of the JEC data. The information provided by Figure
2 indicates that:
CI) the different definitions yield significantly differ-
ent dollar totals; however,
2The JEC approximation used herein was calculated by adding
the DOD and the Veterans, Space and International expenditure
categories and 75% of the Interest category for each of the
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Figure 2. The Cost of National Security: 1950-1977
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(2) the overall trends are essentially the same over
time, regardless of which definition is used.
Although there are some slight variations, due to the com-
parison of appropriations and expenditures, they are not
significant enough to negate the use of Congressional defense
appropriations as a measure of Congressional concern for U.S.
national security over time.
B. REQUIRED CORRECTIONS
Figure 2 clearly indicates that the absolute cost of
national security has generally increased since 1950. This
figure is not, however, an adequate representation of the
real cost of national security or Congressional concern over
time, since it is based on current dollar data. V7hile cur-
rent dollar figures are relevant to price structure which
exists at a given time, in order to compare costs over time,
the data must be converted to constant purchasing power to
eliminate the impact of inflation. Additionally, since the
concern being measured herein is for U.S. national security,
the appropriations must also be corrected for the impact of
U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia.
1. The Impact of Inflation
In order to eliminate the impact of inflation, current
dollar figures must be converted or deflated into constant
purchasing power. There are currently a number of different
kinds of deflators available, since there is no ideal or per-
fect way to correct for inflation. There is, however, as of




of military goods and services. The current DOD procedure
is to deflate the purchase of goods and services based on
the "federal purchases" deflator of the Department of Com-
merce and military pay and allowances by a separate deflator.
Since the exact DOD deflators were not available for this
research, the "federal purchases" deflator was used to deflate
Congressional defense appropriations, even though those
appropriations include both purchases of goods and services
and military pay. It is, however, estimated that, since the
deflators vary only in degree and not magnitude, that the
difference between the actual DOD deflated data and the
"federal purchases" approximation is not significant enough
to alter the overall deflated data trends.
Figure 3 shows a comparison of the current dollar and
"federal purchases" deflated Congressional appropriations
for the 1950-1976 period. The information provided by this
figure indicates that:
CD except for 1951, 1969, 1972, and 1973, the current
and constant dollar trends are essentially the same, even
though inflation has affected the magnitude of the annual
changes
;
(2) the apparent Congressional appropriations increases
in 1951, 1969, 1972, and 1973 were negated by the impact of
inflation:
3The Departments of Defense and Commerce are currently
developing a deflator which is based on the DOD ' s experience
and that deflator should be available in calendar year 1978




._.__. Constant (1972) dollars
Figure 3« Current and Constant Dollar Appropriations
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(3) current dollar increases since 1972 have been sig-
nificantly reduced by inflation; and
(4) constant dollar purchasing power in 1974, 1975, and
1976 was at a lower level than at any time since the 1959-
1961 period.
2. The Impact of Southeast Asia
The impact of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia is
not only more difficult to correct for than inflation, but it
is also a very controversial subject. The actual cost of
that involvement is still largely undetermined and there are
no accurate records of how much money was requested, appropri-
ated, or expended. Although the Johnson administration in-
cluded estimated and actual Southeast Asia expenditures in
the FY 1966 through 1969 budget presentations, President
Nixon chose to obscure the cost of Vietnam by including it in
the overall "national defense" account. It is interesting to
note that the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee told
a Boston Globe reporter in 1975 that an accurate or total
figure was "hard to get a handle on" because of "sloppy book-
keeping" (Ref. 5, p. 847).
For purposes of this research, the estimated incre-
mental costs compiled by the Department of Commerce (Ref. 6,
p. 326) are assumed to be approximately equal to what was
requested, appropriated, and expended for military operations
in Southeast Asia. These incremental cost figures reflect
the estimated costs which were incurred over and above the
normal peacetime costs of operating a baseline force. While
22

this correction factor is admittedly not totally accurate, it
does attempt to take into account the approximately $110
billion which was expended by the DOD in Southeast Asia between
1965 and 1976.
Figure 4, based on data contained in Appendix A, shows
the 1950-1976 Congressional defense appropriations trends in
constant dollars with and without the estimated appropriations
for Southeast Asia. The information provided by this figure
indicates that:
(1) the overall trend since 1965 is substantially differ-
ent if the estimated Southeast Asia appropriations are excluded;
(2) the appropriations related to U.S. national security
decreased significantly between 1963 and 1967; and
(3) although there was an increase in 1968, the appropri-
ations for U.S. national security between 1968 and 1976 were
lower than at any time since 1960.
C. THE CORRECTED DATA
The data presented in this chapter indicate that the abso-
lute cost of national security (Figure 2) has shown a general
increasing tendency since after the Korean War peak. They
have also shown that the current dollar trends are not repre-
sentative of the real cost of Congressional concern for U.S.
national security, unless corrected for the impact of infla-
tion and U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. After
applying those corrections, the data are not only more repre-


























s • ^Excluding estimated Southeast Asia
appropriations
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1950 55 60 65
Fiscal Year
Figure 4. The Estimated Impact of Southeast Asia (Constant dollars)
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but also more revealing. The final indicator of Congressional
concern, as measured by the corrected Congressional defense
appropriations (Figure 4) indicates that Congressional concern:
(1) hit a significant peak during the Korean War, but also
showed an approximate 100% net increase between 1951 and 1955;
(2) increased somewhat in 1956 and 1957, but decreased
in 19 58; '
(3) increased sharply in 1959 and leveled off in 1960 and
1961;
(4) increased sharply in 1962, leveled off, and subse-
quently decreased significantly between 1964 and 1967; and
(5) increased sharply in 1968, but has fluctuated up and
down since that time, with the most recent trend being upward
since 1974.
While these individual changes are not considered in-
depth until all measures are brought together in Chapter VI,
it is significant to note that the major changes in Congres-
sional concern appear to occur relative to major historical
events. Figure 5 shows the overall constant dollar, South-
east Asia corrected indicator of Congressional concern and
some of the major historic events which occurred during the
1950-1976 period.
The 1951-1954 Korean War peak is undoubtedly the most
notable feature of the graph; however the net increases of
approximately $28 billion between 1951 and 1955 and $20 billion
between 1955 and 1963, and the decrease of almost $22 billion
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Figure 5. Congressional Concern: 1950-1976
26

significant to note that the Soviet explosion of a hydrogen
bomb, the "bomber gap," the launch of sputnik, the "missile
gap," the Berlin crisis, and a change of presidents all
occurred before or during the 1955 to 1963 increase, and that
the Cuban Missile Crisis preceded the 1963-1967 decrease.
The increase in 1968 and the oscillations since that time are,
however, not as easily associated with historic events. Even
though the incremental costs of Southeast Asia were subtrac-
ted, it is likely that some of the 1968 and subsequent appro-
priations were required to reconstitute or equip CONUS or
European forces which v/ere drawn down during the massive Viet-
nam buildup. The oscillations since 1968 are probably related
to the need to correct some of the deficiencies caused by
neglect during Vietnam and also the uncertainty as to the real




While the individual periods of increasing and decreasing
concern will be further discussed in Chapter VI, it seems
reasonable to draw some general conclusions about Congressional
concern at this time. The data indicate that Congressional
concern, as measured by Congressional defense appropriations,
is not static and has varied considerably over the 1950-1976
period. Aside from the Korean War peak, Congressional concern
generally increased between 1950 and 1963 and the significant
increases may relate to historic events such as the Soviet
explosion of an H-bomb, the "bomber gap," sputnik, the "missile
27

gap," international tension, such as the Berlin crisis and
a change of presidents. There was a notable decrease in Con-
gressional concern after the Cuban Missile Crisis and although
that concern subsequently increased in 1968, it has fluctuated
since that time. Even though the most recent trend has been
upward since 1974, the level in 1976 was still below that of
any year since 1960.
E. AN ADDITIONAL NOTE ON CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
While Congressional defense appropriations provide a use-
ful means of measuring the major changes in Congressional con-
cern for purposes of this research, it should be noted that
Congress has not always been an independent creator of defense
dollars. Table I shows the Congressional changes to the de-
fense budget requests between fiscal years 1950 and 1977. The
information provided by these data indicates that:
CI) except for fiscal years 1953, 1954, 1958, and 1962,
there was no functional difference between Congressional
defense appropriations and defense budget requests over the
eighteen year period from 1950 to 1968; and
(2) Congressional cuts to defense budget requests since
FY 1969 have ranged from -3.1% to -7.6% and averaged -5.5%.
These data indicate that the Congress generally "rubber-
stamped" the defense budget requests through FY 1968, but not
afterwards. Two of the four exceptions during the "rubber-
stamp" period, those in fiscal years 1953 and 1954, were proba-
bly related to the general reduction of military force levels
as the Korean War drew to a stalemate. While the FY 19 58
28

reduction may have been partially due to Congressional elec-
tion eve politics, it is probably more indicative of a differ-
ence of opinion about the magnitude of the threat in early
1957, prior to the launch of sputnik. The other exception,
the increased Congressional appropriation in FY 196 2 indicates
that Congress thought that more funds should immediately be
devoted to countering the "missile gap."
The Congressional cuts since FY 1969 indicate that Congress
has assumed a greater role in defense decision making, relative
to defense spending. This new Congressional role is indeed
4
significant and is acknowledged for the benefit of the reader.
This changing role does not, however, negate the validity of
using Congressional defense appropriations as an aggregate
measure of Congressional concern for national security in this
research.
4An indepth analysis of the changing Congressional role
in defense decision making is provided by Laurance (Ref . 7) ,
29































































The President is concerned with national security affairs
not only as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, but also
as Chief of State and head of the government. As part of
his duties he seeks to persuade the people that what he wants
to do is congruent with their best interests. This includes
the full spectrum of national programs, policies, and goals,
ranging from domestic social and economic policies aimed at
improving the overall quality of life to national security
programs, which produce no tangible benefits.
The President's concern for national security is articu-
lated in both formal and informal channels. The formal
channels include his inaugural address and the annual state
of the union and budget presentations. The informal channels
include press conferences, statements, speeches, and press
releases which are largely oriented toward clarifying or
justifying policies or maintaining and mobilizing public
support. There are of course limits as to what can be said
in these unclassified channels and therefore not all national
security matters can be enunciated in public. However, these
channels provide an important means by which the President
can appraise the Congress, the American people, and foreign
nations, friend and foe, of the why and wherefore of U.S.
national policy and capabilities. Of all these sources, the
annual state of the union and budget presentations probably
provide the most comprehensive, regularly-recurring, documen-
tation of presidential concern. The State of the Union
31

Messages are used to develop a measure of expressed presi-
dential concern, while the defense budget requests provide
a measure of overall concern, whether expressed or not.
Since this analysis is based on these required, formal,
presidential presentations, it does not consider the special
national security related speeches or presentations, such as
President Nixon's State of the World Messages. These annual
(1969-1973) Nixon presentations are, however, mentioned here
to alert the reader to a possible alternative expression of
President Nixon's concern for U.S. national security. Al-
though this alternative is acknowledged, it is not considered
herein due to the design of this research and focus on the
State of the Union Message.
A. THE STATE OF THE UNION
Since the state of the union presentation provides an
annual review of the major problems, including national secur-
ity, facing the nation, it can be used to develop an indicator
of expressed presidential concern for national security over
time. The indicator developed in this chapter is based solely
on the portion of the message devoted to national security
In addition to Nixon's State of the World Messages of
January 30, 1969, February 18, 197Q, February 25, 1971,
February 9, 1972 and May 3, 1973; President Kennedy presented
special messages on the proposed defense budget increase on
March 28, 1961 and urgent national needs on May 25, 1961; and
President Eisenhower presented special messages on defense
reorganization on April 30, 1953 and the draft and military
retention on January 13, 19 55.
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affairs and not the actual textual remarks. Those remarks
are admittedly relevant to the final analysis and are
addressed in Chapter V.
It should be noted at the outset that although the State
of the Union Message is an annual presentation, there is no
standard format and the messages differ widely in style and
content from president to president. A list of the messages
considered in this analysis is contained in Appendix B. It
should be noted that in 1953 both Presidents Truman and
Eisenhower and in 1961 both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy
made separate state of the union presentations. In both
cases, the message of the incoming President was used since
that of the incumbent was largely oriented toward recapping
the accomplishments of his administration. However, the 1969
message of President Johnson was used, since the incoming
president did not make a state of the union presentation.
Additionally, since President Nixon never delivered the defense
segment of the 1973 series of state of the union presentations,
there is no data available for 1973.
1. Developing the Measures
The measures discussed herein are based on the total
number and relative percentage of paragraphs and column inches
devoted to national security in the State of the Union Messages
between 1950 and 1977. Two different defintions of what con-
stitutes presidential concern for national security were used
to produce four separate, but interrelated measures. The
broad definition included presidential reference to either the
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military capabilities or threat posed by foreign nations,
U.S. defense policies, capabilities, or requirements, arms
control and disarmament, and the need for or status of col-
lective security. Specific reference to the political threat
of communism was not included, except where associated with
collective or mutual security. References to the military
problems and policies in Korea were included, since they were
usually tied to the need for collective security and U.S.
national security. References to the military situation in
Southeast Asia were not included, since the texts of the
Vietnam era messages indicated that that situation was
addressed separately from remarks pertaining to U.S. national
security. The other definition of presidential concern is
much narrower in scope and included only references to actions
or developments which the president indicated were required
to counter the threat to U.S. national security.
Using these definitions, presidential concern was then
measured by determining the number and percentage of paragraphs
and the number and percentage of column inches devoted to each
definition of national security. When counting paragraphs,
all were counted equally regardless of length. While the para-
graph lengths did vary from president to president and some-
times from speech to speech, the overall pattern within a given
speech was fairly consistent. After counting the total number
of paragraphs and determining the total column inches in a
given message, the message was then read to determine the num-
ber of paragraphs devoted to the broad definition of national
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security. A second reading then determined which paragraphs,
if any, were related to action(s) required definition. The
appropriate paragraphs were then measured to determine the
column inches devoted to each definition. The resultant
total numbers are listed in Table II and the associated per-
centages in Table III.
It should be pointed out that the paragraph measure
was the primary objective of this section and that the column
inch measure is largely used as a check on the accuracy of
counting paragraphs. The total numbers and percentage vari-
ations are used herein to check the difference between the
total concern for national security over time and the rela-
tive concern when considered within the context of all issues
which needed to be addressed. The total numbers or absolute
measures are to some degree a function of the style and
especially the overall wordiness of the entire message, but
they tend to counteract the problems encountered when there
are a large number of issues to be addressed in a given
message and only a limited space or time available. The per-
centage measures, on the other hand, compensate for the over-
all wordiness of the messages, but not the problems associated
with the total number of issues addressed.
2 . Measures of Presidential Concern
Figure 6 shows a graphic comparison of the total or
absolute measures, paragraphs and column inches, of presiden-
tial concern for national security. The information provided
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C.1] the president expressed the most concern for national
security from 1951 through 1963 and again in 1972 and 1977; and
(2) expressed comparatively less concern in 1950, from
1964 through 1971, and between 1974 and 1976.
It should be noted that since these absolute measures are
related to the overall wordiness of the message, some of the
significant peaks may be due to the increased length of the
individual message. The apparently significant increase in
1972 is, for example, at least partially due to the increased
length of the 1972 message, which was almost twice the mean
paragraph length and four times the mean column inch length.
Figure 7 is a comparison of the relative or percentage
measures of presidential concern for national security. These
measures compensate for the overall wordiness of a given
message by expressing presidential concern for national secur-
ity as a percentage of the total message. The information
provided by this figure indicates that:
(1) the president expressed the most concern for national
security from 1951 through 1963 and again in 1977; and
C2) comparatively less concern from 1964 through 1976.
While both the total and percentage measures show that there
was an increase in 19*72, the percentage measure suggests that
total measure increase was largely due to the increased length
of that message.
Figures 8 and 9 show the total and percentage measures,
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concern for action Cs) required. As with the broader defini-
tion, the percentage measure of action Cs) required, corrects
for the wordiness of individual messages, with 1972 again being
the most notable case. While these figures show that the
president was more concerned prior to 19 63 than afterwards,
they also show that the president has not always indicated
that new or renewed initiatives were required to counter the
threat to U.S. national security. Figures 8 and 9 indicate
that:
CI) presidential concern was at essentially a baseline
level in 1950, 1959-1960, 1964 through 1971, and in 1975;
C2) at a somewhat higher level in 1953, 1957, 1962-1963,
1972, 1974, and 1976; and
C3) at its highest level in 1951-1952, 1954-1955, 1958,
1961, and 1977.
3. Selecting One Measure
The data presented thus far indicate that regardless
of whether presidential concern is considered in absolute or
percentage terms, the national security and action (s) required
measures indicate that:
(1) the president expressed the greatest concern for
national security from 1951 through 1963, with notable peaks
in 1951-1952, 1954-1955, 1958, and 1961;
(2) expressed comparatively less concern between 1964
and 1971; and
C3) has expressed increased concern since 1972, with
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However, if the difference between the national secur-
ity and action (s) required definitions is taken into account,
the data are somewhat more revealing, since the rhetoric
associated with national security is eliminated. The differ-
ence between the two measures also indicates that the Presi-
dent generally devotes some portion of the State of the Union
Messages to national security, even if no new or renewed
action(s) is required to counter the threat to U.S. national
security. These differences indicate that the action (s)
required measure is probably more representative of presi-
dential concern for national security over time and the
action (s) required graphs in Figures 8 and 9 indicate that
the President:
(1) expressed the greatest concern for U.S. national
security from 1951 through 1963 and since 1972, with notable
peaks in 1951-1952, 1954-1955, 1958, 1961, and 1977 and less
concern during the other years during these periods; and
(2) comparatively little concern from 1964 through 1971.
The various measures of presidential concern show
essentially the same trends over time; however, since the
action Cs) required measure is probably most indicative of
presidential concern, it will be used in the comparison of
presidential, Congressional, and public concern in Chapter VI
B. DEFENSE BUDGET REQUESTS
The second indicator of presidential concern is aimed at
identifying overall presidential concern, whether expressed
or not. This indicator is based on the changes in the annual
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defense budget request and as in the previous chapter it keys
on the logic that, all other things being equal, changes in
concern for national security should be reflected in changes
in defense budget requests as well as Congressional appropri-
ations. While some might argue that the defense budget request
is actually the DOD's and not the president's request, it
should be noted that the DOD is actually constrained by govern-
ment fiscal policy as determined by the President and his finan-
cial staff. The DOD shopping list and budget request would
probably be at least somewhat larger if not so constrained.
As discussed in Chapter II, the current dollar figures are
neither representative of the real cost nor the real concern
for national security over time. For those reasons the defense
budget requests must be corrected for the impact of inflation
and U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia before they
can be used as an indicator of presidential concern for U.S.
national security over time. Since the procedures used for
these "federal purchases" deflator and the estimated incremen-
tal Southeast Asia costs, are the same as were used to correct
the Congressional defense appropriations, they are not dis-
cussed in detail herein. However, the data used in this sec-
tion are included in Appendix B for reference.
Figure 10 shows the constant dollar, Southeast Asia cor-
rected graph of defense budget requests. The information pro-
vided by this figure indicates that presidential concern, as
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(.1) hit a significant peak during the Korean War, but
also showed an approximate 100% net increase between 1951 and
19 55;
C2) slowly, but steadily increased from 1955 through
1961;
(.3) increased sharply in 1962 and 1963, but leveled off
in 1964 and decreased significantly between 1965 and 1967;
and
(4) increased sharply in 1968, but has fluctuated up and
down since that time, with the most recent trend being up-
ward since 1974.
In more general and somewhat oversimplified terms, the defense
budget request data indicates that presidential concern can be
divided into three fairly distinct periods. Aside from the
Korean War peak, the period between 1952 and 1964 is charac-
terized by increasing concern. The period between 1964 and
1967 is characterized by decreased concern and the period since
1968 by fluctuating concern and uncertainty.
C. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is somewhat unrealistic to attempt to compare the year-
to-year changes of the action Cs) required and defense budget
request measures, since the expressed concern can vary con-
siderably from year to year, while the changes in budget requests
are somewhat constrained. That is to say that there are fiscal
and physical limits as to how much could be requested or spent
on national security in a given year, regardless of the magnitude
46

of change in the expressed presidential concern. It is, how-
ever, possible to compare the major trends or tendencies as
long as the difference in timing between the State of the
Union Message and defense budget request is considered. Since
the fiscal year actually begins prior to the calendar year,
the budget for fiscal year 1960, for example, went into effect
1 July 1959 and the FY 1960 budget request was based on essen-
tially the same historical data base as the 19 59 State of the
Union Message. Therefore, the State of the Union Message for
given year (x) should be compared with defense budget request
for fiscal year (x+1)
.
Figure 11 is a graphic comparison of presidential concern
for national security as measured by the constant dollar,
Southeast Asia corrected defense budget requests and action(s)
required remarks from the State of the Union Messages. It
should be noted that the graphs have been adjusted so that the
State of the Union Message for year (x) corresponds to the
defense budget request for year (x+1) and also that the number
scale can only be used to compare the individual trends or
graphs and not between graphs. The historical events are pro-
vided only as a point of reference and will not be discussed
until Chapter VI. The information provided by Figure 11 indi-
cates that:
CI). there was considerable concern for action (s) required
from 1951 to 1958, with peaks in 1951-1952, 1954-1955, and
1958 and that defense budget requests increased during that
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(2) there was no expressed concern for action (s)
required in 1959-1960 and the corresponding defense budget
requests (FY 1960-1961) leveled off;
C3) there was a sharp increase in concern for action (s)
required in 1961 and significant increases in the defense
budget requests in FYs 1962 and 1963;
(4) concern for action(s) required decreased in a base-
line level in 1964 and remained at that level through 1971,
while defense budget requests decreased from FY 19 6 5 through
FY 19 67 and fluctuated up and down since that time; and
C5) the increased concern for actions required in 1972
and 1976 corresponds with increased defense budget requests
in FY 1973 and 1977.
This indicates that presidential concern prior to and
after 1963 was different and that the president was generally-
more concerned prior to that time than afterwards. The oscil-
lations in the defense budget requests since the early 1970s,
coupled with the increased concern for action Cs) required
since 1972, further suggests that the president is generally
more concerned in the mid 19 70s, than he had been between
1964 and 1971. This increased concern of late is highlighted
by the fact that the expressed concern for action (s) required
in 1977 was approximately as high as it had been in 1951-1952
or 1961, and that 1976-19 77 was the only time in the twenty-
seven year period when concern for action (s) required increased




Although, somewhat oversimplified, the data indicate that
presidential concern for U.S. national security can be sum-
marized as:
CD at a high level from 1951 through 19 63;
(2) at a comparatively low level from 1964 through 1971;
and
(3) somewhat uncertain during the early 1970s, but gener-




The objective of this chapter is to investigate possible
measures of public concern for national security. It should
be recognized from the outset that public opinion is difficult
to identify much less measure, and that there is only one
data source, public opinion polls, available over time. While
these polls have certain limitations, they are the best means
available for measuring public opinion.
There is a considerable volume of public opinion poll data
covering numerous topics and questions; however, there is no
single question which has consistently and systematically
attacked the problem of public concern for national security
or national security affairs. For that reason, this chapter
is of necessity limited to the more or less indirect measures
of public concern. The primary focus is on the national secur-
ity related responses to the Gallup Poll question about the
"most important problem" facing the nation. While this ques-
tion does not directly tap public concern for national secur-
ity, it does provide an indication of the public concern and
awareness of the international and domestic problems and
issues which could potentially affect U.S. national security.
In addition to this measure, the type, number, and percentage
of national security related questions asked over the period
provides an overview of the "newsworthiness" of national
security within the context of the issues of the day. The
results of some of the specialized polls and the public
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attitude toward defense spending are also discussed to substan-
tiate the overall and especially the most recent trends.
A. OVERVIEW MEASURES
Since the pollsters are in the business of measuring pub-
lic opinion on the issues of the day, the type, number, and
percentage of national security related questions asked each
year should be indicative of the overall "newsworthiness" and
concern for national security, within the context of the major
issues of the day. While this sounds like a very straight-
forward measure, it is somewhat difficult to operationalize,
since there is no standard definition of national security
affairs. For purposes of this research, a rough measure was
created by counting the Gallup Poll questions related to the
prospect of war, military preparedness, capabilities, and
defense policies of the U.S., its allies, and adversaries,
nuclear weapons, civil defense, defense spending, disarmament,
and military alliances and commitments. Questions related to
crisis situations and areas such as Korea, Berlin and the
Middle East were included, however, since Southeast Asia is a
case in itself, questions so related were not included. The
data for this measure came from the Gallup Poll books, CRef.
14) which provide an historical recap of that organization's
survey questions and responses by newspaper release data
through 1971. This measure is limited to the 1950-1971 period
because compatible data is not readily available for the 1972-





Figure 12 shows both the number of national security related
questions asked each year and that number as a percentage of
the total number of questions asked by the Gallup Poll each
year between 1950 and 1971. Both measures indicate that
national security was a more "newsworthy" issue prior to 19 6 3
than after that time and also that this measure is sensitive to
international crises as evidenced by the peaks relative to the
Korean War and the Berlin crisis in 19 61.
While this "bean counting" indicates that the periods be-
fore and after 1963 are different, it is also useful to look
at the type of questions asked over the years. Figure 13 shows
the major categories of national security related questions
which were asked by the American Institute of Public Opinion
CGallup Polll between 1950 and 1977. This figure shows that
although some very direct national security related questions
have been asked over the years , that there are some serious
time discontinuities with most of them. What the figure does
not show is that even within these artificial categories, there
are some problems with inconsistencies and incompatibilities
in question wording, which would limit the use of these ques-
tions in an in-depth analysis over time.
The "war down the road" category, for example, includes ques-
tions which asked the respondent whether he thought that there
would be war or world war this year, next year, in five years,
ben years, twenty-five years, or within his lifetime. The
question wording and age of the respondent would certainly
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contains questions which asked the respondent if he thought
atomic, hydrogen, or nuclear weapons would be used against
his hometown or the U.S., or whether such weapons should be
used in a future war against Russia or Red China or in Korea
or Vietnam. These problems are further compounded by the
lack of an adequate or appropriate methodology for combining
related questions to develop a combined indicator.
Figure 13 does, however, indicate that there is a
difference in the type of questions asked by the Gallup Poll
before and after the early 1960s. Prior to about 1963, the
Gallup Organization asked a number of questions related to
the possibility of war, the U.S. position in military alli-
ances, and military strength and capabilities. However, the
fact that similar questions have not been asked since that
time suggests that national security, at least as seen by
the Gallup Organization, has been a less significant issue
since the early 1960s.
B. THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM
Due to the limits imposed by the public opinion poll data,
the primary focus of this chapter is an exploratory attempt
at categorizing public concern for national security based
on the only question which has been consistently asked over
the 1950-1977 period; what is the most important problem
facing the nation? While this question does not directly
attack the problem of public concern for national security,
it is indicative of the public concern and awareness of the
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international events or situations and the major U.S. policies
or actions, which can have either an immediate or perceived
potential effect on the U.S. national security. Since the
responses to this question are spontaneous, in that they are
not suggested by the interviewer, the most important problem
question minimized the "status conferring" effect which often
prompts responses to the more direct foreign policy or like
questions, which the respondent has either no knowledge of
*. • 6or interest in.
Being spontaneous, the responses are subject to change as
current events, the world political and military environment,
and U.S. involvement therein changes. The "average" respon-
dent is not likely to be concerned with international events
and U.S. national security policy unless he believes that
those events or policies can affect him, or his family,
friends, or country. Public concern for international
events, military policy and preparedness, U.S. foreign in-
volvement, and related areas and activities is likely to
increase during a period of increased threat or crisis and
decrease during more peaceful times when more attention and
energy is devoted to correcting the domestic problems which
will improve the overall quality of life.
The data for th*is section was taken from the reports of
the Gallup Poll. Specifics of the poll itself are not
c
The Gallup Poll surveys are personal thirty to forty-
five minute, in-home interviews conducted by trained inter-
viewers. This is a very unique social situation where the
respondent is asked to provide his opinion for posterity.
It is to a certain extent, a status conferring opportunity
which can prompt a response to very direct and specific ques-
tions, which the respondent otherwise has neither knowledge
of nor interest in.
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addressed herein except to note that it employs scientific
polling techniques based on a standard national sample of
1500 to measure the public opinion on the issues of the day
in order to satisfy the requirements of the polls over one
hundred and fifty subscriber newspapers. Specifics about
the poll design and sampling techniques are addressed in
Ref. 14, p. v-vii and Ref 15, No. 59, p. 15-23.
1. The Most Important Problem Data
The data consist of the reported responses to sixty
most important problem questions which were asked between
1950 and 1977. The historical problem of incompatible and
inconsistent question wording was minimized by selecting
only the questions which:
(1) dealt with the problems facing the nation or country;
and
(2) asked the respondent what he thought, rather than
asking him to pick from a given list.
Of the sixty questions selected by this criterion, 48 asked
the respondent what he thought was "the most important problem
facing the (this) country today?" The total question variants
used in this analysis and the number of surveys that were used
are listed in Table IV. The specific questions and the
national security related responses used in this analysis
are contained in Appendix C.
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Table IV. Most Important Question Variations
What do you think is the most important problem facing the
(this) country today? (48)
What do you think is the most important problem facing this
country (2)
What do you think is the most important problem facing the
nation today? (2)
What do you consider the most important problem facing the
nation today? (1)
In your opinion, what is the most important problem facing
the country today? (2)
What do you regard as the biggest problem or issue facing
the Government in Washington today? (3)
What do you think is the most important problem facing the
entire country today? (1)
If you could sit down and talk with President Eisenhower
about any problem facing this country, what problem would
you most like to talk about? (1)
The real difficulty with the most important problem ques-
tion is not in the wording, but in the response reporting.
Table V is a summarized list of the major categories into
which the Gallup staff lumped the individual responses for
reporting purposes. The table shows that a number of differ-
ent phrases have been used to categorize essentially the
same responses and that several responses were often combined
into very general categories. This reporting inconsistency
militates against following any one response through the en-
tire twenty-seven year period and in effect necessitates the
development of a combined value for each survey. It should
be noted that Vietnam is included in Table V only to show
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Table V. National Security Related Responses
1950 War, threat of war; communism; atomic bomb control.
1951 War and foreign policy, Russia, threats to peace,
cold war.
1952 Not asked.
1953 Korean war; peace, avoiding World War III; the draft.
1954 Threat of war, war in Asia, dealing with Russia;
communism in U.S.; working out peace; foreign policy
problems; H-bomb, national defense.
1955 Foreign policy problems, working out peace, dealing
with Russia, Red China; communism in U.S.; defense
preparedness.
1956 Threat of war, Suez, foreign policy; communism in
U.S.; national defense.
1957 Foreign policy, dealing with Russia; nuclear tests,
atomic control; defense preparedness; "sputnik,"
missiles
.
1958 Keeping the peace; Sputnik, space problems; national
defense.
1959 Keeping the peace; national defense; "space" problems
1960 Foreign policy; missile gap, other areas of national
defense.
1961 Not asked.
19 62 War, peace, international tension.
1963 Cuba, Castro; other international problems, Berlin,
Laos, etc.
1964 International problems (Russia—threat of war) ;
foreign affairs.




1970 Vietnam ; international problems (general)
1972
1973 Other international problems; Vietnam
1974 Foreign affairs; international problems
1977
Included only to show that Vietnam was generally the most
important problem from 1966 into the early 1970s.
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that it was the only real national security or international
response the Gallup Organization listed between 1966 and 1969
and that it was on the most important problem list from 1965
through 1973. Additionally, since Vietnam is not included
in this analysis, there is therefore no data for the period
between 1966 and 1969.
Table VI shows the results of adding the various
national security related responses in each survey to deter-
mine a survey score. The table also lists an annual score
which is the authentic average of the survey scores for that
year. It should be recalled that these scores are estimated
to be a measure of public concern for the international and
domestic issues and problems which could affect U.S. national
security. While the table shows that there are some signifi-
cant fluctuations between individual survey scores, this is
not unexpected. Since the responses to each survey are spon-
taneous, the results are subject to change as current events
change and are therefore dependent on the combined world and
domestic environment at the time the question was asked.
Additionally, since the primary focus herein is on the over-
all trends and major changes over time, the fluctuations be-
tween individual surveys is not considered significant.
2 . The Most Important Problem Trends
Figure 14 is a graph representation of the annual
survey scores for the national security related responses to
the most important problem question. The information pro-
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Figure 14. The Most Important Problem Annual Scores
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(1) public concern was greatest from 1950 through 1962,
with highpoints between 1950 and 1955, and 1959 and 1962;
(2) decreased significantly between 1962 and 1965; and
(3) continued a general decreasing trend through 1974,
but increased sharply in 1977. While this measure indicates
that public concern was high from 1950 through 1962, decreased
during the mid 19 60s, and was at a comparatively low level
from 1970 through 1977, it is also useful to look at the
responses which were associated with the annual survey scores.
Figure 15 is a combination of the data from the annual survey
scores in Figure 14 and the national security related responses
as summarized in Table V. The information provided by Figure
15 indicates that:
(1) the major concerns from 1950 through 1953 were re-
lated to the Korean War, the threat of war, and communism;
(2) the threat of war and keeping the peace were major
concerns from 1954 through 1960 and defense preparedness or
national defense was usually also mentioned;
(3) keeping the peace remained an important concern in
the early 1960s and the threat of war and communism were
added to the list of concerns in 196 5;
(4) Vietnam was the major concern from 1966 through 1969
and remained on the list of concerns through 1973; and
(5) the concern since 1974 has been for foreign relations
or international problems.
This data indicates that this measure is sensitive to
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the peaks relative to the Korean War and the late 1950s to
early 1960s. It also indicates that sputnik and space were
mentioned as problems in the 1957-1959 period, but that his-
toric events did not significantly change overall concern.
It is also significant to note that although national defense
was often mentioned (eight of seventeen surveys) between 1954
and 1960, it has not been a reported response since that time.
Also, six of the surveys conducted between May 19 65 and May
1966 reported responses which implied a relationship between
the situation in Vietnam, the threat of war, and the threat
or spread of world communism. The fact that these responses
were not reported after 1966 suggested that the situation in
Vietnam was different from that in Korea in the early 1950s,
when the threat of war and communism were specified responses
not only throughout the war, but also into the immediate post
war period. This also suggests that after the initial years
of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, the public generally
disassociated that situation from any threat to U.S. national
security.
While the most important problem data do not adequately
characterize public concern for national security, they do
provide a useful indication of the public concern or awareness
for the international and domestic events which could affect
U.S. national security. This measure indicates that the pub-
lic was the most concerned from 19 50 through 1962, with high-
points relative to the Korean War and the international tension
between 1959 and 1962. Concern decreased after 1962 and (aside
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from Vietnam) has remained at a comparatively low level since
1970. Since that time, public concern has fluctuated some-
what with the most notable increase in 1977. While this
increase may not of itself be significant, it may be an indi-
cation that the general decreasing trend may be reversing.
C. THE PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD DEFENSE SPENDING
Another aspect of public opinion which is relevant to
this research is the public attitude toward defense spending.
Since considerable analysis has already been done in this
area, this section will not duplicate previous efforts, but
rather draw on them for the historical trends and discuss
the most recent poll data. In their analyses of the public
opinion toward defense spending, Russett (Ref. 16) and
Clotfelter (Ref. 17, p. 137-144) found that:
(1) the popular attitude toward defense spending from
1950 through the mid-1960s was permissive and generally
followed the political leadership; and
(2) that a small minority favored reducing the Armed
Forces and a somewhat larger minority consistently favored
expanding the military or defense expenditures. It should be
noted that these conclusions are of necessity general in
nature since there is a considerable lack of data points and
there are some significant problems due to question wording
and bias. These previous works do, however, indicate that
Defense spending questions were asked in only eight of
the eighteen years between 1950 and 1968. Russett (Ref. 16,
p. 65-72) discusses the question wording and bias and missing
data problems in-depth in his analysis of defense spending.
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the public was generally supportive of defense spending from
1950 into the 1960s and Russett noted that the range of fluc-
tuation in opposition to and support of defense spending was
only about 20% during that time (Ref. 16, p. 65).
But, something happened to that permissive attitude
between 1960 and 1969. Table VII lists the responses to the
Gallup Poll questions on defense spending from 1969 through
July 1977, with 1960 included only as an indication of the
previous attitude.
Table VII. The Public Attitude Toward Defense Spending










Source: Ref. 14, survey 6 25-K and Ref. 15, No. 50, 71, 88,
93, 101, 112, 129 and 146.
It should be pointed out that all questions, except for
the ones in August 1972 and March 1960, were identical. All
the questions do, however, have essentially the same context
and are equally unbiased. These data indicate that opposition
to defense spending increased from less than 20% in 1960 to
52% in 1969, remained above 40% through 1974 and averages
47% over the 1969-1974 period. It should be noted that these
data, while significant by themselves, are somewhat biased












portion of the respondents in each category probably answered
as they did due to their views relative to the Vietnam issue
and not the issue of U.S. national security.
Likewise there is no way to adequately measure the rela-
tionship between the end of U.S. involvement in Southeast
Asia and the decreased opposition to defense spending since
1974. One could logically conclude that if the increased
opposition to defense spending in the late 1960s and early
1970s were due to Southeast Asia, that that opposition should
decrease and the about right category increase when U.S.
involvement therein ended. While the about right category
has changed somewhat, the most significant offsetting increase
has been in the percentage of respondents favoring increased
defense spending. That category averaged approximately 10%
over the 1969-1974 period, but increased from 12% to 27%
between 1974 and 1977. This increase in turn suggests an
increased public concern for the current capabilities of the
U.S. Armed Forces to ensure U.S. national security. While
these changes since 1974 do not indicate a new long-term
trend is in the making, they do indicate that the public is
generally more concerned now than it has been since the
early 1960s.
The data presented in this section indicate that public
concern for national security, as measured by the public
attitude toward defense spending, can be broken down into
three periods. During the first period, from 19 50 through
the mid 19 60s, the public was generally receptive to high or
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increasing defense expenditures. From the late 19 6 0s
through about 1974 opposition to defense spending was at
a previously unprecedented high level which was at least
partially due to U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.
During the third period, from 1974 through 1977, the opposi-
tion to defense spending has decreased and support for high
and increased defense spending has sharply increased. This
increased support suggests an increased public concern for
the current capabilities of the Armed Forces to ensure U.S.
national security.
D. THE SPECIALIZED POLLS
The final aspect of measuring public concern for national
security considered in this chapter is that of the special-
ized polls and questions. The polls are largely an out-
growth of the past decade's move toward standardizing and
systematically attacking all aspects of political science
research related to public opinion polling. While the avail-
able data base developed by this new movement is limited to
only certain years during the period since the mid-1960s,
since the same questions are used time and again, the results
are comparable over time and worthy of note.
In their "hopes and fears" analysis, Cantril and Roll
found that the American fear of war had decreased signifi-
cantly from 64% in 1959, to 50% in 1964, and only 30% in 1971
CRef. 18, p. 22-23). An associated measure of "worries and
concerns" by Watts and Free shows that overall concern for
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foreign affairs and defense matters has also decreased since
the mid 1960s. Table VIII shows that the five items of
greatest public concern in a 1964 survey were all related to
foreign affairs or national security, but that those items
had slipped considerably in the 1972 and 1976 surveys, being
replaced by domestic issues such as crime, drugs, and the
environment (Ref. 19, p. 33-41, and Ref. 20, p. 9-11).
Table VIII. Worries and Concerns Rankings
1964 1972 1976
Keeping the country out of
war/danger of war 1 15 20
Combating or the threat of
communism 2 14 20
Keeping our military defense
strong 3 9 11
Controlling nuclear weapons 4 - 16
Maintaining respect for the
U.S. abroad 5 10 16
While these measures substantiate the overall trend in
the Gallup Poll most important problem responses, it is also
significant to note some of the more direct measures aimed
at tracing public concern for national security over time.
In addition to the straight ranking measures developed by
Watts and Free, they have developed some composite measures
which deal with the individual question or issue (Ref. 19,
p. 355-357) . Table IX shows the trends from 1964 through
1976 for three of the more critical areas of public concern
for national security. These data indicate that although
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83 81 61 74 81
90 83 66 66 74
86 79 69 69 74
there was a general decrease in concern between 1964 and 1972,
that trend has been reversed at least somewhat in all three
areas since that time and that the concern for keeping U.S.
military and defense forces is now at the same level it was
in the mid 1960s (Ref. 19, p. 33-41 and Ref. 20, p. 9-11).
Table IX. Critical Measures of Public Concern (composite scores)
1964 1968 1972 1974 1976




These specialized polls and questions indicate that even
though the primary concerns may now be domestic issues, the
American public has not forgotten about national security.
While they tend to substantiate the general conclusions which
can be drawn from the Gallup Poll data, these specialized polls
also indicate that public concern for national security can in
fact be measured, however, it requires a systematic and direct
attack on the problem.
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS
At this point it seems reasonable to conclude that the
newspaper oriented Gallup Poll does not provide sufficient data
to adequately and accurately measure the public concern for
national security over time. There is a considerable volume
of data available, but most of it is oriented toward specific
and largely isolated areas and there are no consistently asked
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questions which directly attack the problem over time. It
should, however, in all fairness, be noted that the Gallup
Organization is in the business of supporting subscriber
newspapers requirements and of necessity oriented to the
issues of the day and not in-depth trend analysis. It is not
the poll's fault if national security is not one of those
burning issues.
Even with these limitations, the poll data have provided
a number of useful indications of the major changes in public
concern for national security over the 1950-1977 period,
which are generally substantiated by the results of some of
the more direct specialized polls of the past 10-15 years.
Figure 16 is a graphic summarization of the various measures
discussed in this chapter. It is interesting to note that
the Gallup Poll question and most important problem indica-
tors both indicate that the public concern was significantly
different before and after the 1963-1964 time frame. From
1950 through that time, the public was not only generally
supportive of high or increased defense spending, but also
more concerned with the world and domestic issues which could
potentially affect U.S. national security. Aside from the
Korean War peaks, concern was highest during periods of
international tension and the historic launching of sputnik
did not significantly change the overall level of concern.
The period after 1964 is, however, in sharp contrast to
the previous decade. Not only did public concern for the












The Public Attitude Toward Defense Spending




















Figure 16. Public Concern for National Security
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issues diminish, but so did the pollsters' interest in
national security as an issue of the day. Vietnam actually
dominated concern in the late 19 60s and domestic problems
assumed a higher priority than defense or foreign affairs
issues. Only since about 1974 have there been indications of
renewed public concern for national security. While the
more indirect most important problem measure has shown a
general reversal of the previous downward trend since 1974,
the more direct specialized poll questions and the increased
support for high or increased defense spending indicates that




V. TO COUNTER THE THREAT
The objective of this chapter is to provide an explana-
tory link between the major changes in presidential, Congre-
sional, and public concern for national security over the
1950-1977 period with changes in the perceived threat to the
U.S. as well as the actions taken to develop forces to coun-
ter it. The national security remarks of the state of the
union presentations provide the basis for this chapter since
they address the changing nature of the threat and what has
been and needs to be done to counter it. A more specific
indication is also provided by reviewing the major changes
in U.S. forces-in-being and where the DOD spends the defense
dollar relative to service emphasis.
A. WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID
The State of the Union remarks on national security are
particularly relevant to this section, since they indicate
both the general nature of the threat and also recommended
programs and actions to counter it. While there are limits
as to what can be said in such a public presentation, Presi-
dents have generally used the state of the union presentation
to justify major defense policies and programs and comment
on the world military balance and U.S. military capabilities.
The actual remarks are too lengthy to be contained herein,




The 1950 message was given in what was essentially a
"peacetime" environment and President Truman indicated that
the U.S. would "maintain a strong and well-balanced defense
organization." The 1951 and 1952 messages were, however,
dramatically different, with emphasis given to both the
events in Korea and the growing threat of Soviet military
power. President Truman indicated that the Soviet Union had
continued to expand its military production and increase
its "already excessive military power." After noting that
the Soviet Union had detonated two more atomic devices in
1951, he said that the U.S. had not made adequate progress
in the field of defense against atomic attack and that that
failure was the same as adding to the enemy's supply of
atomic weapons. He also indicated that the U.S. had to
convert plants and divert materials to defense production in
order to develop a "capacity to turn on short notice arms
and supplies that may be needed for a full-scale war," and
added that 1953-1954 would be the peak period for defense
production. In the 1953 message, both Presidents Truman and
Eisenhower emphasized the need for defensive strength and
preparedness, however, there was greater emphasis on military
accomplishments and U.S. retaliatory power, than on what
needed to be done to counter the threat.
However, only one year later, President Eisenhower placed
added emphasis on what needed to be done. In the 1954 and
1955 messages he indicated that increasing Soviet strategic
air power necessitated the strengthening (1954) and later
7 7

acceleration of continental defense efforts, including civil
defense. Additionally, he pointed to the need to place heavy
emphasis on the air power of the Navy and Air Force, increase
supplies of nuclear weapons, and share tactical nuclear
weapon technology with the European allies to strengthen the
overall defense effort. In 1956 the emphasis again began to
shift toward explaining military accomplishments and develop-
ments rather than emphasizing what needed to be done. In that
year, President Eisenhower indicated that the development of
long range missiles had been on an accelerated basis for
some time and that the U.S. was moving as rapidly as possible
toward developing nuclear powered ships and aircraft. He
added that the production of more modern aircraft would con-
tinue and that the U.S. and Canada were developing warning
networks to strengthen continental defense.
In 1957 the emphasis was only on general military strength
and President Eisenhower indicated that the U.S. security force
was the most powerful in U.S. peacetime history. He went on
to say that it was a major deterrent to war and that it
could "punish heavily any enemy who undertakes to attack us."
While the overall emphasis on U.S. military strength continued
into 1958, President Eisenhower indicated that 1958 would be
a year in which important decisions about the future develop-
ment of the Armed Forces had to be made. He said that the
most powerful deterrent to war was the retaliatory power of
SAC and Navy aircraft and that the U.S. had a broadly based
and efficient defensive strength. The problem was not the
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strength today, but rather the "vital necessity of action
today to ensure our strength tomorrow."
The President acknowledged the consensus opinion that
the launch of Sputnik, in the fall of 1957, had demonstrated
that the U.S. was behind the Soviets in some areas of long
range missile technology development. But, he did indicate
that it was his conviction that the U.S. could have the
missiles, in the needed quantity and in time, to augment the
deterrent power of manned bombers , if the necessary action
was taken. The net result was to indicate that there was a
need to again accelerate ballistic missile programs and also
the defense efforts associated with warning equipment,
strategic bomber dispersal, and antimissile missiles. With
regard to other forces, the President noted that the Thor and
Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) were
already ordered into production, but he also said that the
development of advanced aircraft, nuclear powered ships and
submarines, improved ASW weapons, and mobile forces needed to
be accelerated.
Only one year later, President Eisenhower began to shift
the emphasis from the potential threat and what was required
to counter it, to highlighting the military accomplishments
of the previous year. In 1959 the President indicated that
the IRBIis were being deployed to operational units and that
great strides were being made in ballistic missile develop-
ment and that the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile
tICBM) was marked for rapid development. He also noted that
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the U.S. had successfully placed five satellites in orbit
and that the latest one foreshadowed new developments in
worldwide communications
.
President Eisenhower continued to emphasize the military
accomplishments in his 1960 and 1961 messages. In 1960 he
noted that "America possesses an enormous defense power"
and added "it is my studied conviction that no nation will
ever risk general war against us unless we should be so
foolish as to neglect the defense forces we now so powerfully
support." He also indicated that U.S. long range striking
power, unmatched in manned bombers, had taken on a new strength
as the Atlas ICBM became operational in 1959 and that the
Polaris ballistic missile submarines which were becoming oper-
ational would be one of the most effective sentinels of peace.
In that same message the President also acknowledged the con-
tinued need to modernize tactical forces in order to be pre-
pared to meet a situation of less than general nuclear war.
In his final message in 1961, President Eisenhower briefly
reviewed the military developments of the previous eight
years with particular emphasis on the "tremendous advances
in strategic weapons systems." He also cautioned that the
U.S. "must not return to the crash program psychology of the
past when each new feint by the Communists was responded to
in panic," and noted that the "bomber gap" had been a fiction




President Kennedy apparently did not agree with his
predecessor and eighteen days later indicated that the "tide
of events has been running out and time has not been our
friend." He went on to add that the lack of a consistent,
coherent military strategy had necessitated a complete
reappraisal of U.S. national security strategy. However,
even while that study was underway, immediate action was
required to increase strategic mobility forces and accelerate
the already accelerated ballistic missile programs, with par-
ticular emphasis on the Polaris ballistic missile submarines.
The President went on to add, "we need an invulnerable missile
force powerful enough to deter any aggressor from even
threatening an attack he would know could not destroy enough
of our own force to prevent his own destruction." In 1962,
the primary emphasis was on the improved strategic and tacti-
cal military posture. President Kennedy also noted that the
all-or-nothing posture would leave no choice but inglor-
ious retreat or unlimited retaliation. He went on in 1962
and again in 19 63, to indicate that there was a need to im-
prove air, missile, and civil defense programs and to develop
a more powerful and flexible non-nuclear force with anti-
guerrilla capabilities.
In 1964 President Kennedy indicated that the U.S. must
and would maintain the "margin of military safety and superi-
ority" in conventional, strategic, and anti-guerrilla forces
that President Kennedy developed and successfully used in
the Cuban Missile Crisis and nuclear test ban treaty. After
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the 1964 address, President Johnson made very little reference
to national security except for noting in 1967 that the Soviet
Union had increased ballistic missile capabilities and begun
to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow.
This conspicuous lack of reference to national security issues,
other than a passing reference or remarks about arms control
and disarmament, continued through President Johnson's tenure
and President Nixon's 1970 and 19 71 messages.
It was not until 1972 that increased emphasis was placed
on national security. In that year President Nixon indicated
that increased defense spending was required for research and
development and to proceed with new weapons systems to "main-
tain our security at an adequate level." The President indi-
cated that there was a need to proceed with measures to reduce
the vulnerability of strategic forces, replace sea and land
based ballistic missiles with improved missiles, and deploy
the Safeguard ABM system. He went on to add that tactical
forces needed improved weapons and that naval ship building
had to be increased in order to "maintain our strength at
sea." The defense part of the State of the Union series was
not presented in 1973 and in his final message in 1974,
President Nixon mentioned that increased expenditures were
needed to assure continued readiness and force levels, in the
face of rising costs, and to give the U.S. the military
strength to maintain its security.
In his first message after assuming office, President
Force made only a passing reference to national security and
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indicated that although fully adequate conventional and stra-
tegic forces cost many billions of dollars, the investment
was sound insurance for U.S. safety and a more peaceful world.
In 1976 President Ford indicated that U.S. "military power is
without equal," but added that real growth in defense purchasing
power was needed as well as action to reform and strengthen
the intelligence community. In his final presentation in 1977,
President Ford placed significantly increased emphasis,
relative to the preceding fourteen years, on not only national
security, but also on what must be done to counter the threat.
At that time, the President noted that while U.S. strategic
force levels had leveled off, the Soviet Union had continued
a slow, steady buildup of its own forces. The President also
indicated that, in order to maintain the strategic balance,
the U.S. had to look to the 198 0s and beyond and urged that
the U.S. update the strategic triad by purchasing the B-l
bomber, the Trident ballistic missile submarine, and a more
advanced ICBM. Additionally, he indicated that tactical forces,
with particular emphasis on naval ship building, needed to be
improved so that the U.S. could deter all types of aggression.
In his concluding remarks on national security, and for the
first time in over a decade, the President warned that it would
"require a sustained effort over a period of years to maintain
these capabilities."
These remarks indicate that presidential emphasis on
national security and military capabilities has varied con-
siderably over the 1950-1977 period. The remarks have ranged
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from passing reference, to highlighting accomplishments, to
recommendations that certain actions be taken in order to
develop the capabilities required to counter the threat to
U.S. national security. Table X is provided at this point as
a summarization of the major thrust of the national security
remarks from the State of the Union messages from 19 50 through
1977.
These data indicate that the Presidents, faced by differ-
ent and changing threats, over the years, have sought to
develop different military capabilities to counter the threat
at the time. From 1950 through 1953 the Presidents were faced
with the need to improve and expand general and all-around
strategic and tactical military capabilities including air
and civil defense against a possible nuclear attack. From
1954 through 1956, President Eisenhower, faced with an increa-
sing threat posed by Soviet air power, sought to counter that
threat by developing a large strategic retaliatory force and
improving air and civil defense in order to minimize the
destruction of a nuclear attack on the U.S. and in 1957 he
indicated that the U.S. was in good shape. Although ballistic
missiles were already under development, the technological
surprise of Sputnik in 1957 caused an acceleration of those
programs, but by 19 59 President Eisenhower again indicated
that the U.S. was making sufficient progress in countering
the threat.
But, President Kennedy saw the problem and the "missile
gap" differently and not only accelerated the ballistic missile
84

Table X. State of the Union Message Emphasis
1950 maintain defense organization
1951 build stronger military forces, faster; increase
aircraft and tank production capacity
1952 build up general military capabilities; improve
civil defense
1953 U.S. defenses have doubled over past 2% years
1954 emphasis on air power; strengthen continental and
civil defense
1955 emphasis on air power; accelerate continental and
civil defense; produce more nuclear weapons
1956 emphasis on aircraft; nuclear ships and submarines;
continental and civil defense
1957 U.S. security force most powerful in U.S. history
1958 decisions about future; accelerate ballistic missiles;
improve warning and defensive posture, tactical forces
1959 air striking forces powerful deterrent; ICBMs
operational; ICBMs progressing
19 60 air striking power unmatched in bombers augmented
by Atlas ICBMs; Polaris SSBNs becoming operational;
modernize tactical forces
1961 reappraise defense strategy; accelerate ballistic
missile programs, especially Polaris; increase
airlift capability
1962 improve continental defense and warning; significant
improvements already
1963 improve continental and civil defense; build up non-
nuclear forces
1964-1971 maintain general military capabilities
1972 replace older ICBMs and SLBMs ; deploy Safeguard;
improve tactical forces, especially Navy
1973 no defense message
1974 increased expenditures needed to assure readiness
1975 defense is costly but sound insurance
1976 defense budget provides for real growth; need to
strengthen intelligence community
1977 need new systems to update strategic triad; improve
tactical forces, especially Navy
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programs, but also pushed for a general upgrade of conventional
non-nuclear forces. After the U.S. show of strength in the
Cuban crisis, the Presidents devoted only limited references
to national security and military capabilities, other than
indicating that U.S. capabilities and strength would be main-
tained. It was almost a decade later that President Nixon
gave renewed emphasis to the need to improve military capabili-
ties, both strategic and tactical, with particular emphasis
on the Navy. From 1973 through 19 75, defense and many other
issues were largely overshadowed by Watergate and economic
problems and even in 1976 defense received little mention
other than noting the need to correct the budget decreases due
to inflation. By 1977, President Ford indicated that the
situation was such that new systems were needed to update the
strategic triad and improved tactical forces, especially the
Navy, also required attention.
B. WHAT WAS DEVELOPED
The Department of Defense is tasked with maintaining the
military capabilities to counter the perceived threat to U.S.
national security. In order to accomplish that mission, the
DOD must continually analyze the threat, develop a strategy
and military requirements, and subsequently convert those
requirements into a specific force structure. Since this is
an evolutionary process, changes in U.S. military capabilities
and forces-in-being should be indicative of changes in the
nature of the perceived threat. These changes can be iden-
tified by review of forces-in-being as an indicator of the
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major capabilities developed and service emphasis as an indi-
cator of primary mission emphasis and concern.
1. Forces-In-Being
Major changes in military forces-in-being are indica-
tive of the DOD's continuing efforts to develop the capabili-
ties to counter the threat to U.S. national security. Those
changes are normally a function of the strategy developed or
adopted by the DOD for each President. That is not to say
that each new administration will change the prevailing stra-
tegy and there are in fact only four distinctive strategies
over the span of six presidents between 1950 and 1977:






Kennedy-Johnson: Assured Destruction, and
Nixon-Ford: Realistic Deterrence.
While the Truman and Eisenhower strategies, aside from
Korea, were essentially the same, due to Korea, the force
structure development was different. From 1950 through 1952
President Truman was of necessity forced to give increased
emphasis to all aspects of the military problem, tactical and
strategic, and Army, Navy, and Air Force and all major force
levels were approximately doubled during that period. The
number of Army divisions increased from 10 to 20 and the num-
ber of air defense battalions from 43 to 114. The number of
Air Force strategic, tactical, and air defense wings increased
from 48 to 106 and the number of major warships from 2 37 to
407 (Ref. 21, p. 2-3 and Ref. 22, p. 1-2).
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Table XI shows the major force level changes since
1952 under Eisenhower and Kennedy-Johnson strategies, Nixon's
1972 baseline force and the 1976 force levels. The Eisen-
hower strategy was based on strategic superiority and massive
retaliation and the data show that tactical forces received
generally less emphasis after the effects of the Korean War
began to fade. While the number of warships was cut somewhat,
the numbers of Army divisions and Army manpower were cut by
almost one half. Although the number of Air Force tactical
squadrons showed a net increase over the 1953-1960 period,
it should be noted that that number actually peaked at 102
squadrons in 195 7 and decreased to 61 by 19 60. The primary
emphasis was clearly on strategic forces. The strategic
manned bomber force increased from less than 400 propeller
driven B-29, B-36, and B-50 aircraft in 1950 to a peak of over
1850 jet powered B-47 and B-52 aircraft in 1959 (Ref. 23, p.
54) „ The other significant aspect of the Eisenhower strategy
was the emphasis on developing new systems, including IRBMs,
ICBMs, and ballistic missile capable nuclear powered submar-
ines. The Eisenhower strategy also gave increased attention
to air defense including the initial developmental work on
the ABM.
The force structure development initiated by President
Kennedy and subsequently carried through by President Johnson,
was significantly different from the Eisenhower strategy.
Whereas Eisenhower had initiated the major ICBM and SLBM pro-
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refinements to those systems. The shift to a strategy of
assured destruction prompted the development of an "invulner-
able" missile force and saw a significant increase in the num-
ber of ballistic missiles in a relatively short period. By
the fall of 1962, at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis,
the U.S. had a notable strategic advantage as shown in Table
XII (Ref . 23, p. 46)
.
Table XII. Strategic Force Levels in the Fall 1962
United States Soviet Union
639 Heavy jet bombers 100
956 Medium jet bombers 1350
284 ICBMs 35
112 SLBMs __„
Ballistic missile force levels continued to increase until 1967,
when they stabilized at 1054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs. This in-
crease was, however, largely at the expense of the strategic
manned bombers, since the last production B-52s and B-58s rolled
off the line in 1962. With the phase-out of the older B-47s,
by 1968 the strategic bomber force consisted of 570 B-52 and 80
B-58 aircraft (Ref. 25, p. 392-395)
.
Unlike the Eisenhower era, the overall Kennedy-Johnson
strategic buildup was not at the expense of the general purpose
forces. Even though the 1968 data in Figure 17 are inflated
due to Vietnam, it should be noted that the Army was increased
to 16 combat ready divisions as early as 1963 (Ref. 26, p. 318).
Naval forces also showed an increase as new construction ships
joined the fleet at an annual rate of 45 units between 1962
and 1966 (Ref. 4, p. 179). The notable decrease in dedicated
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air defense forces reflected a decreased strategic bomber
threat, while the development of the Sentinel ABM acknowledged
an increase in the ballistic missile threat.
A new strategy variation did not emerge until President
Nixon announced the Nixon doctrine and strategy of realistic
deterrence and nuclear sufficiency in 1971. By that time
almost all force levels, except ICBMs and SLBMs, were at lower
levels than they had been in 1968. Aside from the Poseidon
and Minuteman III ballistic missile follow-ons, the only change
in strategic force levels was the continued attrition of B-52s
and the replacement of the 80 B-58s with 66 FB-llls between
1970 and 1971.
Although tactical air and ground forces have received
increased emphasis since 1972, the numbers of air defense and
naval forces have continued to decrease. The continuing
decline in naval forces is largely due to the retirement of
numerous World War II and immediate post-war vintage ships,
which were kept active during Vietnam. Additionally, new ship
construction averaged only eight units per year between 1967
and 19 71, and although that rate has been increased to fifteen
units per year between 1972 and 1976 (Ref. 4, p. 179), it has
not been enough to offset the mothballing rate. The decrease
in air defense forces was due to the phaseout of active air
defense SAMs in 1975, the decision to inactivate the ABM sys-
tem after one month of operation, and the reduction of manned
air defense fighter-interceptors to an almost insignificant
six squadrons. Aside from the continuing attrition of the
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strategic manned bomber force, the numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs
has remained unchanged since 1967.
Even though this section is based on "bean counting"
and does not take into account overall qualitative improvements,
the numerical changes in force levels are not without signifi-
cance. Regardless of qualitative improvements, there is a
difference between 6 air defense fighter squadrons, no SAMs,
and no ABMs and 65 air defense fighter squadrons and 4,400
SAMs 1 or between 4 00 and 19 50 manned strategic bombers; or the
254 major naval combatants today when the U.S. sea power is
being challenged and 408 similar units, when the U.S. ruled
the seas.
The data indicate that force levels and emphasis have
varied over the years and that different presidents and admin-
istrations have had different opinions about the utility and
necessity of the various forces over the years. Figure 17 is
a graphic summarization of the periods during which the various
forces and capabilities received increased emphasis. The
information provided by this figure indicates that:
(1) the Truman administration emphasized all tactical force
capabilities and also strategic bombers and air defense forces;
(2) the Eisenhower administration emphasized strategic
forces and air defense from 1953 through 1960 and Air Force
tactical air through 1957;
C3) the Kennedy-Johnson administration emphasized all
tactical forces, and ballistic missiles instead of strategic































































































(4) there was a notable lack of emphasis from 1968 to
1972 and since that time only Army and Air Force tactical
forces have shown increased numerical emphasis.
2. Changes in Service and Program Emphasis
Another means of identifying the DOD's efforts to coun-
ter the threat is to look at where the defense dollar is spent.
Since the major missions of the Army and Navy are tactical
and that of the Air Force is strategic, the changing propor-
tion of defense allocations to each of the three services can
be used as an indicator of mission emphasis. An additional
and more direct measure of mission emphasis is the breakdown
between strategic and general purpose forces, which has been
used in DOD financial summaries since the early 1960s.
Figure 18 shows the relative percentage share of
defense expenditures devoted to each of the major services
over the 1950-1977 period. The figure indicates that the Army
has received its greatest emphasis during periods of U.S.
military involvement overseas and comparatively less emphasis
at all other times. It also shows that the Air Force percent-
age share increased significantly between 1950 and 1954,
peaked in 1957 at 48.5%, and remained at greater then 46%
through 1961. Although the Air Force share subsequently
decreased to about 34% in 1970, it was the dominant service
from 1954 through 1969. The Navy percentage share decreased
significantly between 1950 and 1952, fluctuated between 28%




Figure 19 shows the relative percentage share of de-
fense expenditures devoted to strategic and general purpose
forces over the 1962-1977 period. This figure indicates that
the strategic forces have received a generally decreasing
share of the defense expenditures from 19 62 through the early
1970s and that that percentage has remained below 10% since
1972, compared to greater than 20% in 1962. It also shows
that the percentage devoted to general purpose forces increased
over the 1964-1967 period, decreased as the U.S. involvement
in Southeast Asia was reduced, but has increased since 1976.
The combination of the trends from the two figures indi-
cates that the strategic mission emphasis increased between
1950 and 1957, dominated the DOD expenditures between 1954 and
1964, and was comparatively reduced between 1964 and 19 76.
The tactical force mission received its greatest emphasis be-
tween 1950 and 1952, during Vietnam, and since 1972. It is
significant to note that the increased emphasis on the Army in
1950-1952 was apparently at the expense of the Navy and the
increased emphasis on the Navy since 1972 has largely been at
the expense of the Army.
C. CONCLUSION
The data presented in this chapter, as graphically summar-
ized in Figure 20, indicate that the presidential state of
the union remarks on national security are generally indica-
tive of the forces and capabilities which will be developed
in the upcoming years. These data indicate that overall empha-
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Figure 19. Mission Emphasis
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tactical and strategic. From 19 53 through 19 60 the primary
emphasis was on strategic manned bombers and air and civil
defense capabilities. From 1961 through 1967 the strategic
emphasis was shifted from manned bombers to ballistic missiles,
but conventional non-nuclear forces also received increased
emphasis, even before Vietnam. 1969 to 1976 appears to be
a period of some uncertainty as to what was really needed.
From 1969 to 1972 there was a general decrease in conventional
forces due to the draw down after Vietnam. That decreasing
trend was reversed between 1972 and 1976 and there were also
some qualitative improvements to the ballistic missile force.
Although the president placed added emphasis on correcting
the naval force decline, that emphasis has not been noted in
the number of major combatants due to the retirement of num-
erous older ships and the decision to build fewer, larger,
more capable, and more expensive replacements. It is signifi-
cant to note that after this period of uncertainty , President
Ford's 1977 remarks were similar to President Eisenhower's
1958 remarks in that he seemed to indicate that 19 77 was a
year of decision relative to the future of U.S. military
development, when he said that there was a need to continue
the upgrading of conventional capabilities, and also procure
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VI. THE CHANGING NATURE OF CONCERN
The individual measures discussed thus far indicate that
presidential, Congressional, and public concern for national
security is not static and that it has varied from time to
time over the period from 1950 to 1977. While there is no
single or overall trend, the measures all indicate that con-
cern was relatively high from 1950 through the early 1960s,
considerably lower from the mid 1960s through the early 1970s,
and somewhat greater since about 1974. Figure 21 provides a
graphic summarization of the various measures of concern
which were discussed in Chapters II through IV and the U.S.
force structure evolution which was addressed in Chapter V.
Although the data presented by the various measures do not
provide sufficient detail to explain the causal relationships
between measures, they do, when coupled with what the President
said and what the Department of Defense developed to counter
the threat, provide an insight into the why and wherefore of
the major changes and relative highpoints of concern between
1950 and 'l977.
A. A PERIOD OF CONCERN: 1950-1962
It should be recalled that the overrunning of Eastern
Europe, the coup in Czechoslovakia, and the Berlin blockade
had set the stage for the Cold War and produced the level of
concern which existed in 1950. But, it was the breaking of
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Figure 21. Changing Concern for U.S. National Security
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the reality of the "communist threat" and prompted a previously-
unprecedented level of peactime support for the military and
defense spending. During the height of the Korean War, the
need to "contain" communism was reflected by increases in
presidential and Congressional concern, as measured herein,
as well as a generally high level of public support for in-
creased defense expenditures and also public concern for the
potential "threat of war" and "communism."
It was during the 1951-1953 period that the increasing
Soviet military power and the corresponding increased threat
to the United States was openly acknowledged in the State of
the Union Messages. In addition to building up conventional
forces for the Korean conflict, the U.S. had to develop a
force structure that could counter the threat of Soviet air
power, which was nullifying the historical U.S. geographic
advantage by developing a capability to bring the destruction
of nuclear warfare to the U.S. homeland. The countering
strategy which evolved, that of massive retaliation, necessi-
tated the build up of a strategic retaliatory force which
could absorb a first strike and retain a sufficient capability
to strike back and cripple the warmaking potential of the
enemy as well as civil and military defenses to minimize the
effects of a first strike. As the Korean War drew to a stale-
mate in 1953, the total military problem was apparently coming
under control and there was a notable decrease in expressed
presidential concern and defense requests and appropriations.
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But, President Eisenhower expressed increased concern for
the growing potential of Soviet air power in 1954 and 1955 and
although defense requests and appropriations decreased after
the end of hostilities in Korea, they did not return to the
pre-war level. Aside from the Korean War peak, the overall
net increase of approximately 100% in requests and appropria-
tions between 1951 and 1955, indicates that "official"
(presidential, Congressional, and DOD) concern for U.S. secur-
ity was significantly higher after the Korean War than it had
been before. Expressed presidential and public concern
decreased after 1955; however, requests and appropriations
continued a slow, steady increase in order to procure the
strategic manned bombers and air defense forces required to
counter the threat. By mid 1955 the strategic retaliatory
force of over 1200 aircraft was about three times the 1950
force level and air defense forces, which had also been sig-
nificantly increased, were being augmented by antiaircraft
missiles. Defense budget requests continued a slow upward
tendency through FY 1958; however, Congressional concern
apparently followed the lead of expressed presidential and
public concern. As an expression of its decreased concern,
the Congress decided that less money was needed for defense
and the FY 19 58 appropriations, as voted into law in mid
1957, were noticeably lower than either the request or the
previous year's appropriations. The decreased public, Con-
gressional, and expressed presidential concern suggests that
there was a general consensus that the U.S. was making
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sufficient progress toward countering the "bomber gap" and
the threat to U.S. national security.
However, less than a year later, that sense of security
was shaken by the launch of sputnik, which demonstrated that
the Soviet Union was making substantial progress in ballistic
missile technology. Although President Eisenhower devoted a
considerable portion of his 1958 state of the union presenta-
tion to national security and action (s) required to counter
this emerging new threat, hindsight indicates that his remarks
were largely oriented toward reinforcing public and Congres-
sional support for continued heavy investment in the defense
effort. This call for renewed support was probably necessi-
tated by the decreased Congressional concern and decreasing
public concern. Even though the Cold War philosophy had
dominated America since the late 1940s, there had been a
notable lack of war or conflict which directly threatened the
U.S. homeland and the 1950s had proved to be a period of un-
precedented domestic prosperity. Sputnik therefore provided
the psychological impact required to revitalize support for
continued military development.
Although the defense budget request following sputnik
CFY 1959) increased somewhat, Congressional defense appropri-
ations increased more sharply indicating the Congress either
thought that the threat was more serious or was attempting to
restore what had been cut from the preceding year's request.
In either case, both requests and appropriations leveled off
in FY 1960 and 1961 and in a related move, Eisenhower shifted
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his state of the union presentation emphasis from what needed
to be done to what had been accomplished. This shift of
emphasis and leveling off of requests and appropriations indi-
cates that, even as early as 1959, the Eisenhower administra-
tion felt that sufficient progress was again being made toward
developing the capabilities and forces to counter the new
threat. As President Eisenhower prepared to leave office in
late 1960, the U.S. strategic retaliatory arsenal included
over 1500 modern jet bombers, six ICBMs in place, and two oper-
ational Polaris ballistic missile submarines. These data
indicate that sputnik did not have a significant long-range
impact on the Eisenhower administration's concern for U.S.
national security.
The impact of sputnik and Eisenhower's call for support
is not readily identifiable in the measures of public con-
cern investigated herein. "Sputnik" and "space" were cited
by a small percentage of the respondents to the most important
problem question in 19 58; however, there was no notable change
in overall public concern during that year. Although there is
no real way to measure or identify the impact of sputnik,
since public concern stopped decreasing in 1958 and began
increasing in 1959, it appears that sputnik provided the
impetus for reversing the downward trend in public concern.
It may well have provided the backdrop for increased public
concern about the international situation and international




While the Eisenhower administration had reacted to sputnik,
but not the "missile gap," the Kennedy administration, as did
the public, reacted to the "missile gap." Only eighteen days
after President Eisenhower's farewell state of the union pre-
sentation, the newly inaugurated president indicated that he
did not agree with his predecessor and that the entire defense
strategy was under review. Even while that review was under-
way, the new administration ordered the acceleration of the
strategic ballistic missile programs, with particular empha-
sis on SLBMs , and improvements in strategic mobility forces
for quick response to non-nuclear conflicts. President Kennedy's
increased concern in 1961 was reflected in the sharply in-
creased defense requests and appropriations in FY 1962 and a
continued high level in FY 19 63.
By the fall of 1962 a substantial ballistic missile force
had been added to the already unmatched strategic bomber force
and the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis attested to the
overall U.S. military capability. While that event had served
to highlight U.S. military superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union, the Soviet foreign policy failures in the Middle East
and Africa indicated that communism was effectively being
"contained." The combination of these events in turn indicated
that Premier Khrushchev's boastful, saber-rattling speeches of
the previous years had been just that, and that the threat to
the U.S. national security, as well as world peace and security,
was not as great as had been previously estimated. There was,
therefore, less reason to be concerned with national security
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and more attention could be diverted from the military effort
and devoted to the increasing number of domestic problems and
issues. In addition to decreased public concern, defense
requests and appropriations, which had leveled off in FY 1963,
decreased significantly after the Cuban Missile Crisis (FY
1964-1967) , as did expressed presidential concern for actions
required after January 1963.
B. THE GLORY OF 1962
President Johnson not only highlighted U.S. military capa-
bilities in his 1964 state of the union presentation, but
also set the stage for almost a decade of significantly de-
creased concern for U.S. national security when he said that
the U.S. would maintain the "margin of military safety and
superiority" that President Kennedy had developed and success-
fully used in the Cuban crisis and nuclear test ban treaty.
Aside from the immediate decrease in presidential, Congres-
sional, and public concern after the 1962-1963 breakpoint,
the post-Cuban Missile Crisis period is difficult to explain
and the individual measures of concern investigated in this
thesis are adversely affected by events such as the war in
Vietnam, the 6-Day War, Watergate, the recession of the early-
mid 1970s and President Nixon's resignation. The individual
measures are not as readily comparable as they were between
1950 and 1962-1963; however, each measure provides some in-




Perhaps the most striking indicator of the overall de-
creased concern for U.S. national security following the 1962-
1963 breakpoint, is the conspicuous lack of expressed presi-
dential concern for action (s) required and also the decreased
emphasis on national security in the state of the union pre-
sentations between 1964 and 1971. It should also be noted
that aside from the general remarks which linked peace in
Southeast Asia to world peace and security and U.S. security,
the Vietnam issue was addressed as a separate issue in the
State of the Union Messages and not associated with a real
threat to U.S. national security, as was Korea fifteen years
earlier.
Although the impact of Southeast Asia was not considered
relevant to this analysis, other than attempting to correct
the measures for it, it is difficult to ignore, since it domi-
nated the most important problem from 1966 through 1969. It
appears that the public initially felt that the situation in
Southeast Asia was similar to the situation in Korea fifteen
years earlier and there was an implied relationship between
"Vietnam," "the threat of war," and the "spread of world com-
munism" between May 1965 and May 1966. However, the fact that
similar responses were not reported after that time, even
though "Vietnam" remained \he predominant problem through 1969,
indicates that the public, like the president, generally dis-
associated the situation in Southeast Asia from any threat to
U.S. national security. When other national security related
responses to the most important problem question reappeared in
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1970, that measure indicated that public concern was even lower
than it had been prior to Vietnam. Except for a slight increase
in 1973, which was probably related to the situation in the
Middle East, public concern continued a general decreasing
tendency until it hit an all-time low in 1974-1975.
The defense budget request and Congressional defense appro-
priations measures of concern are somewhat of an anomaly
since they oscillate up and down between 1968 and the mid 1970s.
While these oscillations are not readily explainable, they
are probably related to U.S. military involvement in Southeast
Asia and also some uncertainty as to what the U.S. needed to
do to stay on top of the military balance problem. Although
the impact of Southeast Asia was corrected for by subtracting
the estimated incremental costs of U.S. involvement there from
the requests and appropriations measures, it should be recog-
nized that it is impossible to account for the total financial
impact, since no adequate records were kept. It is likely
that the increases in FY 1968 and 19 69 were required to replace
equipment and supplies which had been diverted from the
"national security forces" in CONUS or Europe to Southeast
Asia or even to Israel following the 1967 war. While the
oscillations since FY 1970 may likewise be related to South-
east Asia or the Middle East, they are probably also related
to the uncertainty surrounding both the implications and
seriousness of the most recent Soviet military developments
and also the effectiveness of U.S. forces-in-being and under
development to counter it.
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The only measure which showed a notable increase clearly
indicative of increased concern for U.S. national security
through the early 19 70s was expressed presidential concern.
After a conspicuous eight year lack of expressed presidential
concern, President Nixon gave considerable emphasis to both
action (s) required and underway in 1972. At that time, he
indicated that the ballistic missile force, which had
reached it numerical peak in 1967, was being qualitatively
improved and updated and that conventional forces, especially
the Navy, required increased attention to upgrade their capa-
bilities. While this seemed to signal a new period of in-
creased "official" concern for U.S. national security,
pressing high level national problems including Watergate,
the recession, President Nixon's possible impeachment and his
eventual resignation, caused attention to be turned away from
national security. The fluctuations in expressed presidential
concern and defense requests and appropriations between 1972
and 1976 do, however, suggest that concern increased in 1972
and that although the military problem seemed manageable,
there was some uncertainty. Aside from the references to the
need to spend money on defense or correct future expenditures
for the adverse effects of inflation, it was not until 1977
that the president again expressed considerable concern for
what needed to be done to ensure the capabilities to counter
the threat to U.S. national security.
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C. A NEW TREND?
While the early 1970s are at best indicative of increased
but uncertain concern, all of the measures addressed herein
indicate an increased level of concern since at least 1976.
The single most significant indicator of increased concern
is probably expressed presidential concern, but public support
for defense spending has also significantly increased. While
President Ford had indicated that the adverse impact of infla-
tion on defense spending had been corrected by the FY 1975
and 1976 budgets, in 19 77 he went on to note that specific
action (s) were required in order to maintain the capability to
counter the threat to U.S. national security. Specifically,
he noted that:
(1) U.S. strategic force levels had leveled off, while
the Soviet Union continued a slow, steady buildup of strategic
forces;
(2) in order to maintain the strategic balance, the U.S.
must look to the 1980s and beyond and update the strategic
triad with new weapons systems; and that
(3) tactical forces, especially the Navy required increased
attention.
In pointing to the need to look to the 19 80s and beyond,
President Ford's concluding remarks, which warned that "it will
require a sustained effort over a period of years" to maintain
U.S. military capabilities, were reminiscent of President
Eisenhower's call for renewed support for military development
after sputnik. Indeed the situations are similar.
Ill

The other measures investigated herein also point to a
general increase in concern during the past couple of years.
Defense budget requests and Congressional defense appropria-
tions, no longer complicated by the cost of Southeast Asia,
have shown a steady constant dollar increase since FY 1974.
The increase in public concern in 1976 appears to have at
least reversed the downward trend which started after 1962
and hit a record low, as measured by the most important prob-
lem, in 1974. But, the most important indicator of public
concern may be the attitude toward defense spending. Although
there was a notable decrease in opposition to defense spending
following the end of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, the
most significant change is the increased support for defense
spending since 1974. That support has increased from 10%
over the 1969-1974 period to 27% in May 1977, a level which is
higher than it was during the "missile gap" in 1960.
This is admittedly not sufficient evidence to declare that
the U.S. is returning to the Cold War era of concern; however,
it does indicate that concern for national security in the
mid 1070s is greater than it was during the previous decade.
This increased concern may also indicate that the United States
has regained its sense of purpose since the post-Vietnam
retreat from the world arena and recognized that the general
trends in the military balance since the late 1960s have not
necessarily favored the U.S. If this increased concern con-
tinues, it may well indicate that after fifteen years, the
U.S. is no longer basking in the glory of October 1962 and
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facing up to the fact that as former Secretary of Defense
James R. Schlesinger pointed out, that only the U.S. can
counter-balance the Soviet Union and "there will be no deus
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THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM DATA
Questions and Responses
The following list of most important problem questions
is keyed to the list of responses for the individual surveys
contained herein.
QUESTIONS
A. What do you think is the most important problem facing
the (this) country today? (48)
B. What do you think is the most important problem facing
this country? (2)
C. What do you think is the most important problem facing
the nation today? (2)
D. What do you consider the most important problem facing
the nation today? (1)
E. In your opinion what is the most important problem facing
the country today? (2)
F. What do you regard as the biggest problem, or issue,
facing the Government in Washington today? (3)
G. What do you think is the most important problem facing
the entire country today? (1)
H. If you could sit down and talk with President Eisenhower
about any problem facing this country, what problem would
you most like to talk about? (1)
RESPONSES
Survey #454-K March 195 Question A
War, threat of war 4 0%
Communism 8%
Atomic bomb control 6%
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Survey #480-K September 1951 Question G
War and foreign policy,
Russia, threats to peace,
cold war 56%
Military preparedness 2%
Survey #510-K January 1953 Question H




Survey #528-K March 1954 Question A
Threat of war, war in Asia,
dealing with Russia 18%
Communism in U.S. 17%
Working out world peace 9%
Foreign policy problems 6%
H-bomb, national defense 6%
Survey #530-K May 1954 Question F
Maintaining world peace,
U.S. -Soviet relations 24%
Indochina 18%




Survey #548-K June 1955 Question F
Foreign policy problems,
working out peace, dealing
with Russia, Red China 48%
Communism in U.S. 6%
Survev #555-K October 1955 Question F
—
i .
Keeping the peace, foreign
policy, dealing with Russia 42%
Communism in U.S. 5%
Defense preparedness 2%
Survey #570-K September 1956 Question A
Threat of war, Suez,
foreign policy 46%




Survey #572-K October 1956 Question A
War, threat of war,
Suez, foreign policy 48%
Survey #58 3-K May 19 57 Question A
Foreign policy, dealing
with Russia 40%
Survey #588-K August 1957 Question A
Keeping out of war,




Survey #590-K October 1957 Question A
Keeping the peace, foreign
policy, dealing with Russia 26%
Defense preparedness 7%
"Sputnik," missiles 6%
Survey #593-K January 1958 Question A
Keeping the peace 30%
Sputnik, space problems 11%
National defense 9%
Survey #596-K March 1958 Question A
Keeping the peace 17%
Sputnik, space problems 7%
National defense 3%




Survey #610-K February 1,959 Question A
Keeping the peace 38%
National defense 2%
"Space" problems 2%
Survey #612-K April 1959 Question E
Keeping the peace 44%
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Survey #618-K September 1959 Question E
Keeping the peace 51%
Survey #624-K February 1960 Question A
Issues dealing with foreign
policy Overwhelming majority
Missile gap or another area
of national defense 15%
Survey #629-K June 1960 Question E
Relations with Russia
and the rest of the
world Overwhelming majority
Survey #657-K April 1962 Question A
War, peace, international
tension 63%
Survey #669-K March 1963 Question A
Cuba, Castro 24%
Other international
problems, Berlin, Laos, etc. 39%
Survey #667-K September 1963 Question A
International problems
(Russia-threat of war) 25%
Survey #689 April 1964 Question A
International problems
(Russia-threat of war) 41%
Survey #694-K June 1964 Question A
International problems 35%
Survey #696-K August 1964 Question A
International problems 51%
Survey #698-K September 1964 Question A
International problems,
cold war problems 46%




Survey #711-K May 1965 Question A
Vietnam 23%
Threat of war 16%
Spread of world communism 9%
Internal communism 3%
Survey #714-K July 1965 Question A
Vietnam no percentage
Fear of war and atomic bomb no percentage
Spread of communism no percentage
Survey #717-KC September 1965 Question A
Vietnam 19%





Survey #719-K October-November 1965 Question A
Vietnam 37%
Threat of war 12%
World communism 7%
Threat of Red China 1%
Survey #720-K November 1965 Question A
Vietnam 33%
Threat of World War III 11%
Threat of world communism 9%
Survey #728-K May 1966 Question A
Vietnam crisis 45%
Threat of war 8%
Spread of world communism 5%
Survey #733-K August 1966 Question D
Vietnam war 56%
Survey #735-K October 1966
The war in Vietnam no percentage




Survey #756 January 19 68 Question A
The Vietnam war 53%
Survey #761-K May 1968 Question A
Vietnam situation 4 2%
Survey #764-K-3 June 1968 Question A
Vietnam war 52%
Survey #766 August 1968 Question A
Vietnam 51%
Survey #773-K January 1969 Question A
Vietnam war 40%





Survey #814-B September 1970 Question A
Vietnam war no percentage
Survey #824-K February 1971 Question A
Vietnam, Indochina 28%
Other international problems 12%




other than Vietnam 7%


























GOI #100 February 1973 Question A
Other international
problems 11%
Southeast Asia situation 7%
GOI #100 May 1973 Question A
Other international
problems 8%
Southeast Asia situation 7%
World peace 6%
GOI #100 September 1973 Question A
International problems 11%
GOI #109 July 1974 Question A
Foreign affairs 4%
GOI #118 February-March 1975 Question A
International problems 5%




GOI #131 April 1976 Question A
Foreign affairs 5%
GOI #131 April 1976 Question A
Foreign affairs 5%





SELECTED STATE OF THE UNION REMARKS
President Truman 1950-1953
1950




The Soviet Union has a large air force and a strong submarine
force.
We are building much stronger military forces and we are
building them fast.
...expanding the aircraft industry to produce 50,000 modern
military planes a year.
...preparing a capacity to produce 35,000 tanks a year.
. . .must give priority to urgent activities—military procure-
ment, atomic energy and power development.
...best and most modern equipment for our fighting forces.
1952
...crucial year in defense effort.
...threat of world war is still very real.
The Soviet Union in 1951 continued to expand its military
production and increase its already excessive military power.
...Soviet Union still producing more war planes than the
free world.
...Soviet Union set off two more atomic explosions.
We have made rapid progress in the field of atomic weapons.
In 1951 we did not make adequate progress in building civil
defense against atomic attack.
...failure to provide adequate civilian defense has the same
effect as adding to the enemy's supply of atomic bombs.
Our objective is to have a well equipped, active defense force
large enough, in concert with our allies, to deter aggression
and inflict punishing losses on the enemy if we should be
attacked.
,
... recommend some increases in active forces with particular
emphasis on air power.




The heart of the free world's defense is the military strength
of the U.S.
...1949 Soviet explosion of atomic bomb stimulated planning
for defense mobilization.
We have endeavored to keep our lead in atomic weapons
.
. . .had to strengthen our armed forces and enlarge our pro-
ductive capacity.
...not just a central force that could strike back, but also
defenses and strength to hold the line against attack.
...last 2*5 years more than doubled our own defenses.
President Eisenhower 1953-1961
1953 ^
While retaliatory power is one strong deterrent, another
powerful deterrent is defensive power.
Total defensive strength must include civil defense
preparedness.
1954
...strategic changes in the world during the past year.
Our military power continues to grow.
. . .defense will be stronger if we share our knowledge of
tactical use of nuclear weapons with our allies.
...Armed Forces must regain mobility.
...air power of Navy and Air Force receiving heavy emphasis.
Continental defense must be strengthened.
...indispensable part of continental security is civil
defense.
1955
...Soviet Union increasing strength in nuclear weapons.
U.S. forces are designed for deterrent and defensive purposes,
. . .keep Armed Forces balance and f lexibility--cannot place
undue reliance on one weapon or kind of warfare.
...emphasize modern air power for Navy, Air Force, and Marine
Corps
.
...accelerate continental defense program.
. . .civil defense is also a key element in the protection of
the country.




...continue to push production of modern aircraft.
Development of long range missiles has been on an accelerated
basis for some time.
. . .moving as rapidly as possible toward nuclear powered air-
craft and ships.
...cooperating with Canada to develop warning networks to
strengthen continental defense.
...key to civil defense is expanded continental defense program,
1957
Our security force is the most powerful in our history.
It can punish heavily any enemy who undertakes to attack the
U.S. ...it is a major deterrent to war.
1958
We now have a broadly based and efficient defensive strength.
...great deterrent power is our main guarantee against war.
Unless we act wisely and promptly we could lose that capacity
to deter an attack and defend ourselves.
. . .most powerful deterrent to war lies in retaliatory power
of SAC and Navy aircraft.
...real problem is not our strength today, it is the vital
necessity of action today to ensure our strength tomorrow.
...consensus we are probably behind the Soviet Union in some
areas of long range ballistic missiles.
. . .my conviction that if we make the necessary effort, we will
have the missiles. .. to sustain and strengthen our deterrent
power of bombers.
. . .Thor and Jupiter intermediate ballistic missiles ordered
into production.
...concentrate all antimissile and satellite technology into
one organization.
...accelerate our defense efforts associated with warning
equipment, dispersal bases and crews, long range and other
effective missiles advanced aircraft development, nuclear sub-
marines and cruisers, improved ASW weapons, missile ships,
and mobile forces.
1959
The threat we face is not sporadic or dated--it is continuous.'
...our formidable air striking forces are a powerful f
deterrent.
...great strides made in ballistic missile development.
...intermediate range missiles now being deployed to opera-
tional units.
...Atlas ICBM program marked for rapid development.
...successfully placed five satellites in orbit.
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...latest satellite foreshadows new developments in worldwide
communications. After we have provided wisely for our mili-
tary strength, we must judge how to allocate our remaining
government resources most effectively.
1960
We possess an enormous defensive power.
Long range striking power, unmatched in manned bombers, has
taken on a new strength as the Atlas ICBM becomes operational.
Growing numbers of nuclear powered submarines .. .some to be
armed with Polaris missiles, will be one of the most effective
sentinels of peace.
...continued modernization of tactical forces is costly, but
necessary to add to our strength.
...developing satellites for weather, navigation, communica-
tions, early warning, and reconnaissance.
1961
...tremendous advances in strategic weapons over the past 8
years
.
...civil and non-military defense has been greatly strengthened,
...since 1953 defense policy based on assumption that the
international situation would require heavy defense expendi-
tures for an indefinite period.
. . .must not return to the crash program psychology of the past
when each new feint by the Communists was responded to in
panic.
..."bomber gap" was always a fiction--"missile gap" shows
every sign of being the same.
President Kennedy 1961-1963 /
1961
...reappraise entire defense strategy. *~j
...prompt action to increase airlift capability to better
ensure the ability of our continental forces to respond to any
problem at any spot on the globe.
...step up Polaris submarine program—build and place on
station at least nine months earlier than planned.
...accelerate entire missile program.
We need an invulnerable missile force powerful enough to deter




...military posture steadily improved.
. . .more than doubled the acquisition rate of Polaris
submarines.
...doubled production capacity for Minuteman.
...increased number of manned bombers on 15-minute alert by
50%.
...doubled the number of combat ready divisions in the Army
strategic reserve.
...activated 155,000 Reserve and Guard troops.
...increased troops in Europe.
...built up Marines.
...added new sealift and airlift capabilities.
...expanded the antiguerrilla force.
...increased the active fleet by more than 70 vessels.
...increased the tactical air force by nearly a dozen wings.
Rejected any all or nothing posture which would leave no
choice but inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation.
...nation's first serious civil defense shelter plan is
underway
.
...coming year will increase air force fighter units and
continental defense and warning efforts.
1963
We have undertaken the most far reaching defense improvements
in the history of the U.S.
...recognize that nuclear defense is not enough. . .cannot
afford to be in a position of having to answer every threat
with nuclear weapons or nothing.
...must improve air and missile defenses and civil defense.
...of prime importance—to have more powerful and flexible
non-nuclear forces and antiguerrilla capabilities.





. . .maintain the margin of military safety and superiority
obtained through three years of steadily increased qualitative
and quantitative development of strategic, conventional, and
antiguerrilla forces.
...in 1964 we are better prepared than ever before.
...continue to use that strength as John Kennedy used it in




U.S. national security not mentioned aside from association
between Vietnam and the communist threat.
1967
...Soviet Union in the past year has increased its long range
missile capabilities.
...Soviet Union has begun to deploy a limited ABM system
near Moscow.
1968
...must maintain a military force that is capable of deterring
any threat to this nation's security.
1969
No substantial reference other than arms limitations.
President Nixon 1970-1974
1970




...ended production of chemical and biological weapons.
...need to proceed with new weapons systems to maintain
security at an adequate level.
...need to improve and protect, diversify and disperse
strategic forces for reduced vulnerability.
...refit Polaris with Poseidon and build a new missile launch-
ing submarine with a new, more effective missile.
...replace older ICBMs with Minuteman III and deploy the
Safeguard ABM system.
...strengthen the Navy with emphasis on ship building.
...improve, develop, and procure improved weapons for land
and tactical air forces.
...step up military research and development.





Defense message of the proposed State of the Union series was
never presented.
1974 ^T
. . . increased defense expenditures needed to assure continued
readiness of our military forces and preserve present force
levels.
President Ford 1975-1977 <f
1975
Fully adequate conventional and strategic forces cost many,
many billions, but these dollars are sound insurance for our
safety and a more peaceful world.
1976
Our military forces are capable and ready. . .our military power
is without equal.
Only from a position of strength can we negotiate a balanced
agreement to limit the growth of nuclear arms.
...defense budget provides for real growth in purchasing power.
1977
. . .we have been able to reverse the dangerous decline of the
previous decade in the real resources this country was devoting
to national defense.
...established a positive trend which is essential to our
ability to contribute to peace and stability.
...in past years... our strategic forces leveled off, while the
Soviet Union continued a steady, constant buildup.
To maintain a strategic balance we must look ahead to the
19 8 0s and beyond.
...advocate and strongly urge that we purchase Trident, B-l,
and a more advanced ICBM.
. . .we cannot rely solely on strategic forces to guarantee our
security or deter all types of aggression.
...five year naval building program is indispensable to mari-
time strategy.
...long term effort to improve worldwide capabilities to deal
with regional crisis.
...our national defense is effectively deterring conflict
today, but it will require a sustained effort over a period
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